



# Central and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities in the Run-Up to Euro Adoption

NBP Conference

“Common Currency and its Future: Lessons for the New Member  
States”

October 15, 2008

Christoph Rosenberg

International Monetary Fund


Regional Office for Central Europe and the Baltics

# Overview

1. Convergence and financial deepening on the path to the Euro
2. Related vulnerabilities
  - Rapid credit growth
  - Large current account deficits
  - Cross-border contagion risks
  - Foreign currencies mismatches
3. Conclusions

# The region has been converging fast


## Convergence in Emerging Europe and in the Rest of the World, 2002–06



# This has been closely related with financial deepening...

Growth in GDP and credit to the private sector


*Annual average*



Source: Eurostat, national authorities

# Financial deepening has been driven by closer cross-border financial integration

## Emerging Europe: Increases of financial integration



Source: IMF WEO, October 2008

\*- as percent of total banks


Index of domestic financial liberalization that combines information on interest rate controls, credit controls, competition restrictions, state ownership, quality of the banking supervision and regulation, policies to encourage the development of bond and equity markets, and policies to permit access by foreigners to the domestic stock market. The capital account openness index is from Chinn and Ito (2006).

Credit growth

Most studies find that the stock of credit is still below its equilibrium level in Central Europe (but not in some Baltic and SEE countries)

e.g. Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk (2007), Bache, Egert and Zume (2007), Schadler al. (2005), Cottarell et al.(2005)

**EU countries: Bank credit to the private sector:  
Actual and estimated equilibrium levels (percent of GDP)**




\*Greece (Q1.1999)

Source: National authorities, calculations based on Schadler et al. (2005)

# The pace of credit expansion relative to per capita GDP growth has exceeded that in other emerging market countries


**Growth and Private Sector Credit Growth, 2002–06**  
(Percent)






# Current Account Deficits

# The credit boom has been largely financed from abroad...



# ... contributing to large current account deficits

## Current account deficit *in percent of GDP*




Source: National authorities.


•- forecast

# Financial markets have punished countries with large C/A deficits

## CDS spreads



## C/A deficit and increase in CDS spreads since July 2007



# Determining CA sustainability in the new member states (Rahman, IMF WP 08/92)

**Macroeconomic balance approach:** estimate current account norms based on macro fundamentals (59 countries, annual data 1971-2007)


**CA norm** = f (fiscal balance, demographics, net foreign assets position, relative per capita income, etc.)

⇒ CA norm in the new member states are higher than elsewhere because:

- Large share of dependent population  
(=> lower national savings => higher CA)
- Lower net foreign asset position  
(greater dependence on foreign capital for growth)

# CA deficits in the Baltics and SEE exceed what would be consistent with macro fundamentals

**Current Account Balances and Model Predictions**  
*Percent of GDP*




# What drives the divergence from CA norms?

- **Cyclical or temporary factors:** output gap, capital inflows due to EU accession
- **Structural factors:** export composition, cost competitiveness in manufacturing sector
- **Policy-related factors:** exchange rate regime, financial sector policies


# C/A deficits in Emerging Europe have already lasted longer and have been larger than typical

(IMF WEO, October 2008)


**Number of Episodes**  
(1960 – 2007)



**Episode Length of Deficits (years)\***



**Duration and Average Size of Deficit Episodes**



Source: IMF WEO, October 2008


\*-  $\pm 2$  st.deviation




# Although economic characteristics explain longer deficit spells in emerging Europe, they are now at or beyond the upper end of expected duration

- Predicted mean duration plus/minus 2 standard deviations
- Predicted mean duration
- Actual length

**Model excl. Emerging Europe**




**Model excl. Emerging Europe and Advanced Economies**



# Cross-border contagion risks

# Cross-border exposures by international banks (especially from Sweden, Austria, Italy, Germany) create new channels of contagion (IMF WP, forthcoming)

## Concentration of Emerging Europe Exposure to Western Europe, 2007



Source: Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, June 2008.


Note: Country names are abbreviated according to the ISO standard codes.

1/ Emerging Europe exposure to western European banks is defined as the share of the reporting banks in each western European country in the total outstanding claims on a given emerging European country (both bank and nonbank sectors). For example, about 42 percent of Croatia's exposures to Western European reporting banks is owed to Austrian banks, 38 percent to Italian banks, 13 percent to French banks, etc. For the Baltic countries, 85 percent or more of exposures to the reporting banks is owed to Swedish banks.


# Foreign Currency Mismatches

# Rapid credit growth has been accompanied by a growing share of loans denominated in foreign currencies (EUR and CHF)

**NMS: Credit to the private sector**  
*percent of GDP*



**Emerging Markets: Foreign exchange borrowing**  
*2005, as % of total loans to the private sector*




Note: Regional figures are calculated as medians for respective countries in the region.  
Source: Tamirisa and others, 2007, pp. 30; national authorities,


Note: The indicator is calculated as total credit to the private sector divided by GDP for the NMS (excl. Slovenia).  
All figures were previously transformed to euros.  
Source: national authorities, Eurostat, IMF staf calculations.

# This has led to large currency mismatches in the non-financial private sector and vulnerability to disruptions in the FX swap market


Net FX position, 2007 percent of GDP



Change in net FX position, 2002-2007, percent of GDP



Sectoral net FX position, 2007, percent of GDP



Source: National authorities, IMF staff calculations.

# What drives Euroization in CEE countries?

(Rosenberg and Tirpak, IMF WP/08/173):

$$FXloans_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 irdiff_{i,t} + \beta_2 loantodep_{i,t} + \beta_3 openness_{i,t} + \beta_4 restrict_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- *Euroization* is a byproduct of convergence.
- Foreign exchange borrowing is driven by:
  - access to foreign funds in a fully liberalized environment of capital flows (loan-to-deposit ratio, not foreign bank ownership per se),
  - natural hedging opportunities, through increasing trade openness,
  - a boost to the private sector's confidence in exchange rate stability and imminent euro adoption (interest rate differentials, but not exchange rate volatility drive fx borrowing).
- Regulatory measures have limited effectiveness due to opportunities to borrow directly from abroad (i.e., for corporations).

# Conclusions

- Increasing vulnerabilities in some countries are byproduct of rapid convergence, financial deepening and expected euro adoption
- Countries with high vulnerabilities are being more affected by this current crisis than others
- EU membership fundamentally changes the policymaking landscape requiring more international cooperation. The current crisis has made this more clear than ever, examples:
  - emergency lines of credit for countries that are vulnerable to capital outflows (Iceland)
  - close cooperation of financial supervisors in home and host countries
  - policy coordination, especially during crises (e.g. deposit guarantees)
  - Euro adoption



# Policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability, against the background of existing vulnerabilities

- Tighten macro policies to curb inflation and reduce external imbalances (Southeastern Europe):
  - monetary policy: address second-round effects from price shocks
  - fiscal policy: offset still strong private sector demand; contingency plans for hard landing
  - targeted and temporary income support for vulnerable households (preferable to administrative measures)
- Monetary policy on hold if risks to inflation and output are balanced (Central-eastern Europe)
- Support economy during abrupt adjustment (Baltics):
  - allow adjustment to take its course
  - cushioned by letting automatic stabilizers operate
  - monitor financial sector exposures and prepare contingency measures
- Ensure crisis resolution frameworks in financial sector are operational, including cross-border dimension

# Thank you!

**Dr. Christoph B. Rosenberg**  
Senior Regional Representative

**International Monetary Fund**  
**Regional Office for Central Europe and Baltics**



**Ul. Zielna 37C**  
**0-108 Warszawa**  
**Tel.: + 48 22 338 67 00**  
**E-mail: [crosenberg@imf.org](mailto:crosenberg@imf.org)**  
**Visit our website at: [www.imf.org/cee](http://www.imf.org/cee)**