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NBP Management Board – Marta Kightley, First Deputy Governor

Statements regarding the Tribunal of State for the Governor of NBP can have a negative impact on the economy – Reuters (29.11.2023 r.)

Statements on bringing the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP) Adam Glapiński before the Tribunal of State are an attack on the independence of the central bank and could have a negative impact on the exchange rate of the zloty or the valuation of Polish assets, NBP Deputy Governor Marta Kightley told Reuters.

The opposition, which is likely to form the government, announces that it wants to hold Governor Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State and accuses him of pursuing a monetary policy that favours the outgoing Law and Justice party. Furthermore, in their view, by buying bonds from commercial banks on the secondary market, NBP has violated the Constitution, which prohibits the central bank from financing the budget.

“We strongly believe that this is an attack on the independence of Narodowy Bank Polski. This is fundamental because NBP is one of the most important institutions of the state,” said Deputy Governor Kightley.
“An independent central bank is one of the most important pillars for the functioning of the state, the economy and central banking in developed countries,” she added.

According to the NBP Deputy Governor, the allegations made against Glapiński are groundless.

“If NBP had not lowered rates and introduced asset purchases, a massive slump in the economy would have taken place. Central bank activities were a very important part of the anti-crisis programme,” Kightley said.
“(…) it should be stressed that none of the decisions, whether on interest rates or asset purchases, are individual decisions taken by Governor Glapiński. The Monetary Policy Council and the NBP Management Board, respectively, are behind these decisions,” the Deputy Governor added.

A motion to hold the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal of State may be submitted by a group of MPs, the President or a commission of inquiry. It is submitted to the Constitutional Accountability Committee, which carries out a preliminary assessment. If it decides to do so, it refers the motion to the Sejm, which votes on it – an absolute majority in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of MPs is needed to hold the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal. The Tribunal then decides whether or not a violation of the law has occurred. As a result of the resolution to hold the Governor of NBP accountable before the Tribunal being passed in the Sejm, the Governor of NBP shall be suspended from his duties, which shall be assumed by the Deputy Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski.

“We are confident that the allegations made are completely unfounded. Because we are under attack, because there is a real threat of fulfilment of these promises, we have to speak out about it,” the Deputy Governor said.
“We need to show that there is a legal framework which is not just a Polish legal framework but a European framework and we will certainly use that framework,” Kightley added.

NBP has already announced that it has sent letters to the European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank explaining the current situation.

“It is clear to us that we need to take action not only on the grounds of domestic law, but also international law. From the point of view of the entire European System of Central Banks and modern central banking more broadly, this would set a very, very bad precedent,” said Marta Kightley.

The Deputy Governor added that she had received signals from international investors and institutions concerned about the current situation.

“International institutions, foreign investors are worried about the principles. As this is an attack on central bank independence, they are aware of the potential consequences for the economy. These are people who often come from the central banks and they understand the issues very well,” she said.

She has added that in the midst of the current complicated geopolitical situation, the war in Ukraine, there are a lot of promises formulated by the parties that “may form the government.”

“Under such circumstances, an attack on the central bank’s independence is a recipe for disaster. This can really have a very negative impact on both the exchange rate and bond yields. We have a whole series of events and this is one of the elements that may affect that credibility,” the Deputy Governor added.

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NBP Management Board – Marta Kightley, First Deputy Governor

“These reasons are blunt and political.” The first Deputy Governor of NBP speaks out [interview] – Business Insider (20 November 2023)

“We recognised that it was important to inform the European Central Bank of the threats against the NBP Governor and that there was no legal basis for holding him accountable before the Tribunal of State. We are also asking the ECB, but also the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to take action on this issue. We have already arranged talks with representatives of these institutions,” says NBP First Deputy Governor, Marta Kightley in an interview with Business Insider Polska.

In Marta Kightley’s opinion, the emerging arguments for holding the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal of State are “blunt and political”.
In her view, the Tribunal of State for Adam Glapiński would be an attack on the independence of NBP
Investors may be scared of the market in a country where the central bank governor is suspended, the NBP Deputy Governor argues.
She stresses that NBP would in such a case refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The government can create conditions for itself where debt financing will be more costly and the zloty will lose value, says Kightley

Bartek Godusławski, Business Insider Polska: Will there be a war between Narodowy Bank Polski and Donald Tusk’s government?

Marta Kightley, NBP First Deputy Governor: In the election campaign, certain words were said and written in the so-called 100 policies for the first 100 days of the new government. They included provisions concerning NBP and Governor Adam Glapiński. This is clearly a breach of rules, of the Constitution and of the independence of the central bank, not only under the national law, but also under European law. As long as such announcements are made by the opposition and are part of the election campaign, one should, of course, be concerned, but they do not carry that much weight. However, if this political option were to form a government and the attacks on NBP were to continue and the threats against the central bank, which we treat as an attack on the independence of NBP, were to continue, the situation could get very dangerous.

What if the Sejm decides to hold the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal of State and thus suspend the head of the central bank?

Let us start with the allegations made against the NBP Governor.

The first allegation to emerge relates to the government bond purchases on the secondary market carried out during the pandemic.

This is an argument that is completely misplaced. Nowadays, central banks have a possibility in their instruments to carry out asset purchases. This was done by the Bank of Japan, the Fed, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. If the situation requires, this instrument is used. There is no doubt here under the Polish and European law that such an action is permissible and the central bank may conduct asset purchases.

On the way to the target

Another argument for holding Governor Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State relates to insufficient efforts to combat inflation.

This is the competence of the Monetary Policy Council, but it will be difficult for anyone to prove that the MPC counteracted inflation inadequately because the council conducted these activities in an appropriate way. We were among the first to start raising interest rates, even in a situation of very high uncertainty. The pandemic was still ongoing and we did not know how the epidemiological situation would develop, what action the government would take. Central banks are by nature cautious because reversing decisions they have made can have negative consequences, so they sometimes wait until they have better knowledge and a clearer picture. Therefore, the MPC reacted a while later than central banks in the Czech Republic or Hungary, but also much earlier than the ECB or the Federal Reserve. The increase in interest rates in Poland was radical – from 0.1 per cent to 6.75 per cent. The Council even decided on 100 bp increases at one meeting. It is therefore difficult to make the accusation of a lack of determination in the fight against inflation. It was a very hawkish MPC that was ahead of market expectations. At the time, the Council communicated that inflation would peak in late 2022 and early 2023, and then we would see a rapid decline in inflation to single-digit levels by the end of this year in the region of 7-8 per cent. This has all worked out, while price growth is exactly as the central bank expected and communicated. Interest rates in Poland are still at high levels and have a cooling effect on the economy. Inflation will therefore continue to fall, although this will happen less sharply. We will reach the inflation target of 2.5 per cent plus or minus 1 percentage point by the end of 2025. All this is happening in the face of upheaval from the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the arrival of several million refugees in Poland, with all the consequences for the economy. The economy has experienced many shocks, but during this time the MPC has managed to bring price growth down sharply and prevented a serious downturn.

However, we have faced a very strong slowdown that lasted longer than NBP predicted.

However, this is still a so-called soft landing. In our country the slowdown came earlier than in the euro area, but it is happening there too. It is therefore now possible to wonder what will happen to Polish exports, as they were driving our economy when we faced a cooling of consumption. We expect an improvement in the domestic economy with the situation in the environment of the Polish economy still weak.

Communication channels

Bond repurchases and the fight against inflation are not the only arguments that appear in the discussion about the Tribunal of State. There is also the issue of the politicisation of NBP and its involvement in the election campaign with, for example, interest rate cuts, which were immediately discontinued after the elections. On top of this, Governor Glapiński’s distinctive communication at press conferences, while according to the law, it is he who represents NBP externally.

It is difficult to find arguments that would justify the discussion of the Tribunal of State for the NBP Governor at all. I have shown that there was no violation of the Act or the Constitution. On the other hand, these are the only possibilities that give rise to accountability to the Tribunal. In terms of communication, let me remind you that it consists of many elements. The primary instruments of communication are the inflation and GDP projections. In addition, we have the press releases from the decision-making meetings of the MPC, the minutes, i.e. the description of the discussions at these meetings, we have the monetary policy guidelines, and finally the Governor speaks after the Council meetings and outlines the macroeconomic picture that has influenced a particular decision. The conferences of the Governor are among many elements of central bank communication. For some time there has been a need to simplify NBP’s communication and message to reach the ordinary citizen. The idea is that we should not only communicate with financial markets and experts, but also with the public.

Why?

It is about the ability to influence household inflation expectations. They are to some extent adaptive, i.e. they are influenced by current data from the economy or media information. Reaching the average citizen directly and with a simple message is a very important part of the fight against inflation.

I will return to interest rates and the fact that the sharp cuts just before the elections, surprising to market participants, were perceived as part of a campaign on the part of the Law and Justice government to support the party in the elections.

This brings me back to what I have already said – the decision on interest rates is taken by the MPC, which is a collegiate body, not by the Governor of NBP.

Budgetary uncertainty

In your opinion, were there objective, economic reasons to cut interest rates by as much as 100 bps in two months?

The MPC looks at data, forecasts, expectations and market behaviour. What did the Council see in September when it decided to cut rates by 75bp? It saw a decline in GDP in Q2 and weak data for the beginning of Q3, while this was supposed to be a period of economic stabilisation or even a rebound. NBP’s projections in March and July this year showed a faster rebound in the economy than had actually occurred. On the other hand, inflation was falling at a faster pace than expected. The tap on credit had been turned very tight, the fall in GDP was deeper. From this point of view, there was room to reduce them and the Council adjusted interest rates in line with data indicating that inflation was falling faster than the expectations formulated in the July projection. This was done first by a radical decision, then by a smaller move, and now the MPC has decided that it needs to monitor the situation.

So now the uncertainty means that the MPC must wait to see what happens with regulated prices, e.g. electricity, natural gas, administered prices or tax changes, e.g. zero VAT on food?

The fiscal situation next year is a very big question mark. The range of concerns is much greater. If we were to put the pre-election promises of all the parties making up the ruling coalition together, they are extremely rich. We do not know which of these promises will be implemented and how, and this, after all, will have an impact on GDP and inflation. First, the MPC needs to know the answers to these questions so that it can know how to adjust interest rates. It is also worth remembering that we will only see today’s Council moves in the economy in a few quarters.

Let me come back to the possibility of bringing the NBP Governor before the Tribunal of State. If this happens, he will then be suspended. Then will you take over the management of the entire central bank?

Once again, I will stress that there is no reason at all to charge the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal. The reasons that appear in the public space are blunt and political. I do not find any argument to justify the Tribunal of State for the Governor of NBP and consequently his suspension. You can’t do these things based on unrealistic premises. This is bad for the country, the institutional order and the economy.

Seeking allies

Governor Glapiński, at a conference with the majority of the NBP Management Board members said that the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Central Bank would be informed of the announcement to hold him accountable before the Tribunal of State. Has this happened and what has been submitted to these institutions?

Letters have been sent. We will be meeting with representatives of these institutions and will inform them of the situation surrounding NBP. In the letters, we argue that the actions that politicians refer to are contrary to the EU treaties. We recognised that it was important to inform the European Central Bank of the threats against the NBP Governor and that there was no legal basis for holding him accountable before the Tribunal of State. We are also asking the ECB, but also the IMF and the World Bank, to take action on this issue. We have already arranged discussions with representatives of these institutions, we know that their legal services are analysing the situation and we hope for a rapid response.

However, if politicians decide to put the NBP Governor before the Tribunal of State and suspend him, will you challenge such a decision before the Court of Justice of the European Union?

Of course, we will also use this legal route.

Playing with fire

What market consequences do you expect if Governor Glapiński is brought before the Tribunal of State?

There will be very big consequences, because we are talking about the independence of the central bank, a fundamental issue. We cannot accurately predict this reaction, but it can be very strong. This is playing with fire. Politicians would add a significant element of risk for foreign investors – both portfolio investors, who purchase bonds, shares, or the currency, and those investing directly. The suspension of the NBP Governor without reason is a serious risk for investors and a warning against investing capital in Poland.

We know that the budgetary situation will be demanding next year. The deficit will be relatively high, the borrowing needs are huge, the geopolitical situation is still uncertain. In your opinion, will the row over NBP make it more difficult for the new Finance Minister to manage the budget?

Do you mean a potential increase in yields? Investors may certainly be scared of the market in a country where the central bank governor is suspended. However, this is only one side of the coin, because the problem could also be to threaten with some kind of public finance disaster and then take over the management of the state and convince the markets to lend us money to finance the deficit. The government can create conditions for itself where debt financing will be more costly and the zloty will lose since portfolio investors will start withdrawing from Poland.

Today, however, investors either give a lot of credit to the government or do not believe in holding the NBP governor accountable before the Tribunal of State. Our currency is clearly gaining and the zloty is the strongest against the euro for more than three years.

No one seems to believe that there are real grounds for holding the central bank governor accountable before the tribunal. The situation in the foreign exchange market confirms this.

Public finances are likely to be tight next year. Even the MPC recognises these problems in its critical opinion on the Budget Law. Is the central bank ready to help the government if the market situation is difficult and return to purchasing bonds from the secondary market, as it did after the pandemic outbreak?

Asset purchases are carried out in the very specific situation of a shock that threatens to collapse the economy. This was the case after the pandemic outbreak, when we had a very deep, more than 8-per cent drop in GDP in the second quarter. At the time, we didn’t see what would happen next, but we did see that the economy was collapsing. It was an experience the whole world had not yet tested. That is why we launched asset purchases, because it was no longer possible to go lower with interest rates. Under the conditions of the pandemic and the associated restrictions on economic life, negative interest rates would not increase household spending or investment. Today, we still have elevated inflation, there is only a slowdown in the economy, instead of a collapse, so it is not legitimate to launch asset purchases under such circumstances.

What about the conflict between Governor Glapiński and the member of the NBP Management Board, Paweł Mucha? The public was living with this dispute for several days and today there is silence. Does this mean that the hatchet has been buried?

This is not a conflict within the Management Board, but a situation where one person makes certain claims, including claims of a financial nature. This person is difficult to work with and that’s it.

Governor Mucha also raised other arguments in his letters and these were not of a financial nature, but concerning the functioning of the central bank Management Board.

This is an image created by one person, one party.

In the past, there were already disagreements within the NBP Management Board. Some time ago, two deputy governors of our central bank even resigned because they disagreed with the Governor. In your opinion, should Paweł Mucha also resign?

Indeed, such a situation took place. This is the only comment on my part.

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NBP Management Board – Rafał Sura

RAFAŁ SURA, MEMBER OF THE NBP MANAGEMENT BOARD: WE WILL DEFEND THE GOVERNOR AND THE BANK. “WE HAVE A FULL ARSENAL” – INTERIA Biznes (18 DECEMBER 2023)

“We would have a precedent allowing each successive government to appoint their NBP governor. However, I trust that it will not come to that,” says Rafał Sura, Member of the NBP Management Board, when asked about holding Adam Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State. As he emphasises, there was no central bank intervention in the primary market and, “there is absolutely no legal basis to accuse Adam Glapiński of violating the Constitution in this case.” Interia Biznes’s interviewee also hopes that, “the provision of the law that is harmful to the Polish legal order will be eliminated by the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal.” “The public interest demands that never in the future should any parliamentary majority, regardless of the side of the political dispute, come up with such an idea,” he says. In the interview, he also refers to the conflict within the NBP Management Board.

“We had to take these threats (of holding the Governor Adam Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State – ed.) seriously. “From the very beginning, we have been engaged in discussions with international law firms with expertise in proceedings before the CJEU,” says Rafał Sura in an interview conducted on 14 December 2023.
“I believe that ultimately no motion to the Tribunal of State will come to pass. Please note that, as of today, financial markets are not taking this political announcement seriously”;
Rafał Sura also discusses the implications of the motion to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State. “It would undermine Poland’s authority on the international arena. And we would have a precedent allowing each successive government to appoint its own NBP governor. However, I trust that it will not come to that,” he concludes;
“Inflation in November stood at 6.6%. We expect the same or lower inflation rate in December. The following months should also see a fall in inflation, although there are certain domestic risks”;
“Sadly, Mr Paweł Mucha doesn’t attend to the bank’s affairs too often. As far as I can tell, he had and currently has no (department – ed.). Mainly because his subordinate department directors could not envisage such cooperation.”

Bartosz Bednarz, Head of Interia Biznes: Why did Narodowy Bank Polski buy bonds in 2020-2021?

Rafał Sura, Member of the NBP Management Board: The purpose of buying assets as part of structural open market operations was to stabilise the bond market and provide liquidity to financial markets. We were then in a very deep supply and demand shock due to the coronavirus pandemic. We were not alone in this respect – the European and global economies found themselves in a similar situation. The set of instruments that we used has been very widely employed by the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. In fact, all the leading global banks have utilised these solutions. Nearly 40 different central banks have carried out such operations.

Should the need arise, could this quantitative easing and bond buying be used again?

The structural open market operations which were applied at that time are still valid instruments that can be used by NBP. The solution was not just focused on one possible critical situation. Thus, should – let’s hope not – such deep economic turbulences occur again in the Polish economy, namely a crisis of the same magnitude as the one caused by the coronavirus, the central bank will be able to employ this kind of instrument again.

Does the Constitution allow it?

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Act on NBP and Article 123(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allow us to take such actions. Thus, to raise the allegation of a violation of Article 220(2) of the Constitution is completely misplaced and, I dare say, comes from a poor understanding of this particular provision of the Constitution. This misunderstanding, in the public or rather political space, gave rise to an idea that these actions constitute the grounds to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State. This is even disregarding the fact that the decision to purchase bonds was first taken by the Monetary Policy Council, with me as its member. I remember precisely the discussion on this matter and the atmosphere in which this discussion took place – in a spirit of deep necessity and under conditions of broad unanimity. The executive decision in this respect was later adopted by the NBP Management Board. Thus, the decisions on this matter were taken by collective bodies, rather than individually by the Governor of NBP. Therefore, there is absolutely no legal basis to make the allegation of a violation of the Constitution in this case.

This is a fairly categorical statement.

Accountability before the Tribunal of State (hereinafter “TS”) is specific in the sense that a person listed in Article 1 of the Act on the TS bears responsibility for a culpable specific act attributable to that person in connection with their individual and specific decisions. This act must be culpable – the provisions of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure apply accordingly to the provisions of the Act on the Tribunal of State. It is a very formalised procedure and, consequently, if you read the provisions carefully, you will come to the conclusion that there are no such grounds. I am pleased to note that the legal discussion we have been conducting in defence of the NBP’s independence is proving effective. When we compare the frequency of making these allegations a few weeks ago with what we are dealing with today, it is clear that this massive information campaign in defence of NBP’s independence, the task of explaining the provisions of the Polish Constitution, the Act on NBP and, finally, the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Statute of the European Central Bank – which provides an even higher standard of protection for the independence of the central bank than national law – is starting to bear fruit. The legal effect of this widespread discussion will probably be that the specified provisions of the Act on the TS – let me remind you that it was passed on 26 March 1982, three months after the imposition of martial law – will be eliminated from the said Act by the Constitutional Tribunal (hereafter “CT”). These provisions grossly contradict the Constitution and EU law.

You cited Article 220(2) of the Constitution. Let me recall that there are allegations that the purchase of bonds constituted deficit financing.

To quote the Constitution: The budget act shall not envisage covering the budget deficit by incurring liabilities with the central bank. So how was the deficit financed here? There was no bank intervention in the primary market, namely no debt securities were purchased from the state. The intervention was in the secondary market.

Was it because commercial banks came in the way between the Ministry of Finance and NBP?

Hypothetically, if such intervention occurred in the primary market, one could give it some thought. However, in this case, absolutely everything was done in accordance with the law in force. In any case, before we made these operations, we conducted a number of analyses, not only related to European banks, but also in terms of our domestic legislation. There was clearly no violation of the law in this respect, and the decisions were adopted by a collective body, not by the Governor of NBP.

What does NBP plan to do with these bonds? Let me quote Adam Glapiński: “If the bank was irresponsible, or the governor was a kind of person who should be either brought before the Tribunal of State or suspended (…), then, for example, he would put these bonds on the market, which would cause a complete collapse of the Polish sector – if he was irresponsible. But we are obviously not going to do anything about it. Let it be”. How long should they be kept?

We can only say that each bond issue was subject to specific terms and each bond series has specific maturities. They are spread over time, and the redemption will proceed according to the schedule. There cannot be any rapid, unwarranted sale of these bonds, as they are on our balance sheet and they will reduce the central bank’s balance sheet total as per their maturity dates.

Do you think you have succeeded in cutting the ground from under the 15 October Coalition’s feet in terms of the motion to bring Governor Glapiński before the Tribunal of State?

I see that society and, above all, the political class have come to understand the significance of central bank independence. Defending the independence of the central bank is not a task for us here and now, it is a task for the future and, above all, for the entire society that respects the concept of a democratic state under the rule of law. The public interest demands that never in the future should any parliamentary majority, regardless of the side of the political dispute, come up with such an idea. Let me recall that historically, in 2014, a conversation came to light which led to a conclusion that the previous governor of the central bank had tried to exert pressure on one member of the government to appoint a designated minister of finance. The then Governor of NBP publicly asked the following question in one of his interviews: can someone be brought to trial before the Tribunal of State for talking, can one violate the Constitution of the Republic of Poland by talking? An important and fundamental question from Professor M. Belka! Obviously, it is not possible, as a specific act has to be performed in order to hold someone accountable before the Tribunal of State. Did it occur to the government majority at the time, or the subsequent parliamentary coalition, to suspend the Governor of NBP? Obviously, no such thing has ever happened, and it was in the interests of the central bank, regardless of the political affiliation of both the then and subsequent government. Defending the independence of NBP is a long-term interest of the Polish state.

You have warned in the bank of the possible consequences if the scenario with the Tribunal of State were to materialise.

There would be chaos! It would undermine Poland’s authority on the international arena. And we would have a precedent allowing each successive government to appoint its own NBP governor. However, I trust that it will not come to that. I hold the conviction that reason and the letter of the law will prevail. Today we are dealing with very few isolated opinions in favour of a possible motion to the Tribunal of State. The consequences of such a move would be profound for the country’s financial interests, including the central bank.

Why?

We would certainly see an increase in public debt servicing costs due to rising bond yields. This would limit the minister of finance’s capacity to finance specific economic activities included in the specific programme of the parliamentary majority. That’s the first thing. Secondly, it raises risks on the part of investors, both portfolio investors (who operate on the stock, bond and currency markets) and those interested in direct investment in the Polish economy. Investors always prefer to allocate their funds in economically stable regions and in places where there is no temptation to make upheavals following a change of government. Such upheavals are neither appropriate nor characteristic of well-established democracies. Please name a single European government where, after a change of the executive, an attempt was made to remove the central bank governor in this way. There was one case in Latvia, but it concerned charges of a strictly criminal nature. The situation there was far different from ours. What is more, the Governor of the central bank of Latvia lodged a complaint pursuant to Article 14(2) of the Statute of the ECB and ESCB with the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU) and the European Central Bank joined the complaint. The CJEU overruled this decision as it interfered too far with the central bank’s independence, despite the criminal charges.

When do you expect the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling following the motion filed by Law and Justice MPs?

I hope that this provision, which is harmful to the Polish legal order, will be eliminated by virtue of the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision. This will benefit not only Poland, but also the whole of Europe and the European central banking system. It is my personal satisfaction that before the relevant motions were filed with the CT, I had publicly advocated the need to eliminate these obsolete regulations contained in the Act on the TS from the Polish legal order.

If such a motion was brought to the Tribunal of State, it would be unprecedented as regards the operations of other central banks in Europe.

This is undoubtedly a highly relevant argument. It is worth noting that both the process of interest rate cuts that preceded the quantitative easing operations in Poland and the process of purchasing securities itself were subject to the assessment of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter the “IMF”). And both the reaction to this pandemic shock in terms of rate cuts and Polish QE (Quantitative Easing – ed.) were positively evaluated by the IMF. Also, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the European Central Bank gave a positive assessment.

Who wasn’t cutting rates at that time…?

And who did not employ quantitative easing….?

And yet, the accusations against Adam Glapiński in the public debate are not limited to bond purchases. “The NBP Governor (…) was involved in the election campaign, disregarded the Constitution, financed the deficit, which is prohibited by the Constitution, disregarded NBP’s own rules and regulations by getting involved in a dispute with the members of the NBP Management Board and members of the MPC (whose regulatory competencies he limited). This is a ready-made indictment,” said Ryszard Petru, Third Way (Trzecia Droga) MP and current chairman of the Parliamentary Economy and Development Committee, at the Sejm session of 12 December. Pure politics?

These were and are purely political allegations that are in no way grounded in the law. Now the temperature of this discussion is different. We hear voices from other European central banks that this was an attempt to put pressure on an independent central bank and its statutory bodies.

This is yet another economist. Andrzej Domański, the Minister of Finance, has so far – based on my impression – tried to quell these emotions and has not been so explicit about the Tribunal of State. How do you perceive the cooperation with the new Minister of Finance at NBP?

The fact that the Minister of Finance has cooled political emotions indicates that he is aware of the legal and economic environment of our decisions. The Act on NBP features Chapter 3, ‘NBP and State Authorities’, and Article 21 as a key provision for our cooperation, one that introduces an obligation on the part of the central bank to ensure that, in the performance of its tasks, NBP cooperates with the relevant state authorities in making and implementing the country’s economic policy, while seeking to duly implement the objectives of monetary policy. It is in the interest of the Polish state to have the central bank cooperate with the government – regardless of who forms this government and notwithstanding the side of the political scene. I am confident that in this spirit our cooperation will be for the benefit of citizens. This is my wish for the Minister and NBP.

What is your impression of the fiscal stimulus that will follow the implementation of the new coalition’s promises? From the beginning of the year, these will include, but will not be limited to, pay increases for the public sector. This raises your inflation trajectory for 2024.

It is a fundamental principle in our relationship that the fiscal policy and monetary policy, while interacting, are independent of each other. Therefore, I will refrain from reviewing the announced policy of the Minister of Finance. This is an unwritten but essential rule. And we will stand by it. Obviously, fiscal policy, depending on whether it is tight or loose, impinges upon the inflation trajectory. At present, based on the November inflation forecast, we assume that the CPI will reach 4.6% in 2024, and then return to the inflation target in 2025. This assumption is binding on us at present, although there are risks, such as those associated with developments abroad (the war in Ukraine) and in the Middle East (the Israeli–Palestinian conflict), which could have a profound impact on energy commodity prices and ultimately on price formation processes. Assuming that no adverse developments occur, we are on a course of falling inflation. Inflation in November stood at 6.6%. We expect the same or lower inflation rate in December. The following months should also see a fall in inflation, although there are certain domestic risks. Given that the government will soon address next year’s draft budget, we will then know the final shape of domestic fiscal policy.

What is essential for the central bank today?

There are moves to maintain the zero VAT rate on food, or more precisely its time horizon. We don’t know that today, there is a regulation in force that mentions 2024 Q1. Will the zero VAT rate be extended, though? As of today, we don’t know. In addition, energy prices weigh heavily on next year’s inflation path. There are also announcements that could translate into large expenditure on the budgetary side. As of now, these are announcements and we regard them as possible risks to the ongoing disinflation process. However, until we see the state budget, it will be difficult to give a black and white opinion on it.

What scenarios and measures does NBP have at its disposal, if a motion is filed to hold Adam Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State? We know that the role of governor will then be assumed by the first deputy governor. I am more concerned with NBP’s response to these market risks, which we have already discussed.

As a central bank, we are an institution of public trust, part of the financial safety network – alongside the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, the Bank Guarantee Fund and the Minister of Finance. We are at the forefront of the Financial Stability Committee in the area of macroprudential supervision. We perform a key role in the Polish financial system and in maintaining the country’s financial stability. Therefore, it is impossible for such an important body not to have contingency plans in place, including for this kind of emergency. But I believe that ultimately no motion to the Tribunal of State will come to pass.

Please note that, as of today, financial markets are not taking this political announcement seriously. The Polish złoty is stable, anchored in the very strong foundations of the Polish economy. This is crucial and can hardly be regarded as anything other than the market’s vote of confidence for the central bank’s policies and actions. This situation, however, should not be surprising. NBP is among the 20 central banks with the world’s largest reserve portfolios, which reinforces the credibility of the Polish economy and translates into positive assessments of reserve adequacy by the IMF, rating agencies and foreign investors. NBP holds nearly 360 tonnes of gold. We have already started the process of a gradual increase in NBP’s gold reserves several years ago and today we rank 17th among central banks with the largest gold reserves. Gold not only diversified the risks associated with the other NBP investments – which is particularly important in times of elevated uncertainty as wars are waged across Europe – but also increased the profitability of the reserve portfolio.

Estimates amount to some 130 tonnes this year.

Correct.

Will there be more purchases?

We have a developed strategy in this area, we adopt a holistic approach to our reserves, we observe the practices of other central banks and we analyse market conditions. Any asset allocation decisions – including gold purchases – are shaped by these factors. Obviously, we try not to disclose details until the transaction takes place, but information on the composition and value of reserve assets is made publicly available every month on the NBP website.

But I understand that the strategy is aimed at making gold account for 20% of total reserves, is that right?

Our strategic objective is to ensure the liquidity, security and profitability of the reserves in the long term. And particular asset allocation decisions are, like I said, shaped by many factors. However, we certainly aim to align ourselves with the practices of the leading European central banks.

How many people in Poland and abroad are currently employed by NBP in relation to this risk of bringing Adam Glapiński before the Tribunal of State?

A number of people are employed by the central bank and this is one of the negative aspects of this entire political turmoil. We had to take these threats seriously. There was no alternative: as a central bank, as members of the management board, we are obliged to apply the law. We are not only legally, but also morally obliged to ensure the bank’s independence. We have taken legal actions to conduct the dispute before key institutions. The key institution where the battle for the independence of Narodowy Bank Polski would unfold is the Court of Justice of the European Union. But – as I say – we believe that ultimately it will not come to this, as it would be detrimental both to NBP and to our country.

It is true that you have hired international law firms?

From the very beginning, we have been engaged in discussions with international law firms with expertise in proceedings before the CJEU. Should this threat materialise, we are fully ready, we have a full legal arsenal that we will not hesitate to use for the purpose of effectively defending the independence of the bank.

From which countries?

From European Union countries.

And from the US?

Mainly from the European Union.

The governors of the European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank, and the National Bank of Hungary have responded to the correspondence from Narodowy Bank Polski. Did I miss something, or is there still a lack of response from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to which you also wrote?

You didn’t miss anything. When formulating the message to the mentioned institutions, we were aware that the most appropriate institution – in terms of potential defence of NBP’s independence – is the European Central Bank. However, we deemed it appropriate to inform international public opinion and other important global financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, about the potential threat to the independence of the Polish central bank. However, the EBC is at the forefront. And it must be said that the information conveyed to Christine Lagarde met with the reaction that we expected. The President of the ECB outlined to the ECB Governing Council the possible consequences and, significantly, requested that we update her on any developments. That is what we’re doing. Furthermore, we maintain constant bilateral contacts with various central banks in Europe. I emphasize that President Lagarde’s letter should be interpreted not only as the position of the ECB President, but also of all central banks sitting in the Governing Council of the ECB.

Do you hope to get a response from the World Bank and the IMF?

Our goal was to inform these institutions about the current situation. They obviously lack legislative instruments similar to those of the ECB. In this case, it was about reaching the public as widely as possible.

Is it beneficial for Poland that NBP has sent letters to all these influential and key financial institutions worldwide?

We believe that the independence of the central bank is sacred, hence we will not spare our efforts, we will not spare any means to prevent these attacks, to defend the independence of the central bank.

How much has NBP spent on these activities in the last weeks?

As no political threats have materialised so far, there is no talk today of spending any funds on legal representation. Legal opinions, the main theses of which are presented to the public, are a different matter. The independence of the central bank in financial, functional, institutional, and personal aspects is sacred and we are prepared to defend it.

Don’t you feel a bit sorry for those departments you handed over to the new member of the Management Board?

Absolutely not. Due to his experience, Artur Soboń has the competence to supervise precisely this segment of NBP’s activities. I have no doubt that I have placed the departments in good hands.

And does Paweł Mucha already have a department?

As far as I can tell, he had and currently has no department. Mainly because his subordinate department directors could not envisage such cooperation. Sadly, Mr Paweł Mucha doesn’t attend to the bank’s affairs too often. I’m obviously referring to the substantive work, rather than his communication regarding the bank conducted through social media, contrary to the legal regulations adhered to by the other members of the Management Board. I must admit that it is disheartening to witness this. Modern central banking has never experienced such an instance. It is also awkward to hear statements from the bank’s employees regarding what Mr. Paweł Mucha has been doing lately – publicising matters related to his remuneration and suing NBP for bonuses. As the Management Board, we hoped that at some point Paweł Mucha would reflect and commence cooperation with us. After all, it’s for the benefit of the bank. However, these were empty expectations.

But is he staying on at the Management Board?

That question should be directed to the person concerned. I can only say that the history of the Polish central bank has seen cases where two members of the Management Board, driven by a sense of honour, resigned from their positions. If Paweł Mucha does not see the possibility of cooperation with the Management Board, the decision is up to him.

Did you listen to the press conference of Governor Glapiński after the latest MPC decision?

Of course I did.

Do you have the impression that it was an attempt to bury the hatchet between the central bank and the government?

In my opinion, there is no hatchet to bury. There had only been certain political rhetoric, and that was before the government was formed. I am convinced that the cooperation with the new government will proceed with mutual understanding and for the benefit of citizens.

Is the Polish złoty too strong as of today?

We are dealing with a floating exchange rate regime, which is crucial for us.

Business Insider wrote that NBP’s loss for 2023 could amount to PLN 20 billion. Previous indications envisaged a profit. What happened here?

We are obliged to subject the financial statement to the review of an independent expert auditor, but in order to do so, according to Article 69 of the Act on NBP, we must conclude the year. And the year is still ongoing. We cannot comment on this matter until the expert auditor completes the statement’s review.

Allow me to rephrase it: is there a risk of a loss for 2023?

As long as the year 2023 is ongoing, I cannot comment on that matter, even if I wanted to.

What would a loss mean for NBP?

Extending the principles applicable to joint-stock companies and commercial banks onto the central bank doesn’t make sense, as they are entirely different. Narodowy Bank Polski, like other central banks, including the Swiss National Bank, which reported a significant loss in 2022, cannot be subjected to them.

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NBP Management Board – Rafał Sura

Conversation with Dr Rafał Sura, Member of the NBP Management Board – TVP Info (29.11.2023 r.)

TVP: …the law relating to the possibility of dismissing the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski. I will now talk to my guest, DSc Rafał Sura, Member of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski. Welcome, Professor.

R. Sura: Good morning sir, good morning viewers.

TVP: Well, then, it is precisely in view of the announcements made by politicians who claim that Mr Adam Glapiński, the Governor of NBP, may face the Tribunal of State and that his duties may therefore be suspended. There are many opinions, most are that this would be an unlawful action. I am also asking for your opinion.

R. Sura: Definitely, you evoked some opinions that are right. Right, because they are supported by the law. When it comes to central bank independence, both national law, in particular the Polish Constitution, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular the Statute of the European Central Bank, provide a very high standard of protection for the independence of Narodowy Bank Polski. An independent central bank is the foundation of the market economy. So it is not possible, in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, with a functioning market economy, for responsible politicians to launch such unambiguous attacks on the independence of the central bank, on the governor, but in isolation from the facts, because all of them, and from the law, the applicable EU law and national law, as I said earlier, because all of these accusations that have appeared in the public space so far are, one might say, bizarre in nature. Why? The Governor is accused of starting the fight against inflation too late, when this instrument does not exclusively belong to the competence of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski when it comes to setting interest rates and shaping monetary policy, as this is the domain of the 10-member body that is the Monetary Policy Council. So how can we speak of any individual responsibility before the Tribunal of State here, when the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where individual responsibility is referred to, apply mutatis mutandis to the Act on the Tribunal of State. An act must occur, a culpable act. The age-old principle is that without an act there is no punishment. There is absolutely no logic to this allegation. The second allegation made in the public space relates to the asset purchases that the bank conducted during the Covid pandemic, providing liquidity in the banking market and also preventing bond yields from rising. This allegation is also devoid of any factual or legal rationale because this type of operation has been carried out all over the world, more than 30 central banks all over the world have used this type of operation, including the European Central Bank. Therefore, yes, all the accusations that are in the public space with regard to Governor Glapiński are in isolation from legal considerations and are politically inspired. European law ..

TVP: We are talking about Polish law, but European law, because we have just cited the case of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has challenged a decision in the case of the head of the Bank of Latvia.

R. Sura: Latvia. Thank you very much for this example. It is remarkable for two reasons. The first reason is that today the press office of the Court of Justice of the European Union replied to the Polish Press Agency that such cases are extremely rare. There is not a case in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union that is analogous except for this one concerning a bank, the Bank of Latvia. What does this indicate? This shows that in no European country, where we are dealing with a democratic state under the rule of law, with a market economy, has it ever occurred to a parliamentary majority to formulate this kind of accusation after a change of government, with the consequence of bringing the Governor before the Tribunal of State and depriving him of the possibility of exercising his mandate, because this is contrary to the interests of the country in question. What is happening in Poland today, where such allegations are made in isolation from the facts, in isolation from the law, is damaging the interests of the Republic of Poland. This is the first aspect.

TVP: So that’s it, it’s a blow to business and security in the country, financially?

R. Sura: The country’s finances, on the one hand. And the second aspect, because I would still like to stay with this above-mentioned ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the Governor of the Bank of Latvia. Namely, there it was a different state of affairs, there it was about the fact that the governor was charged with a criminal offence by a service analogous to the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. It filed criminal charges, also linking the bank governor to exceeding his powers. In response to this decision, the Governor of the Bank of Latvia lodged a complaint with the Court of Justice of the European Union. This complaint was supported by the European Central Bank. As a result, this decision was overturned and the Governor of the Bank of Latvia was reinstated to his office. Let me stress again: in Polish conditions, this concerns ridiculous, politically inspired allegations, and in the only case in Europe, concerning the Bank of Latvia, we are dealing with a situation where there were criminal allegations, but this protection of the independence of central banks, European central banks that are part of the European central banking system, is so strong that even in the case of the Bank of Latvia, the Court of Justice overturned the decision. So this proves the legitimacy of our defence, our instruments that we are putting in place as the cases develop. I would like to remind you, because a few days ago we notified the European Central Bank of these groundless accusations, also informing European public opinion of the fact that there is such a ruthless attack on the independence of the central bank in Poland.

TVP: And what scenario do you expect, given that Donald Tusk has already announced that there is a majority in the Sejm for holding the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal of State and he will probably try to do so.

R. Sura: Every MP under Article 104 of the Constitution takes an oath. One of the expressions in this oath, is that he will serve the interests of the Republic of Poland. Therefore, to pass such a motion in the Sejm – I would remind you that a majority of 231 votes is needed for this – would be contrary to the financial interests of the Republic of Poland, and I believe that this will not happen. I would just like to add that in the Act on the Tribunal of State, specifically here reference is made to Article 11, where on this basis this scenario is formulated, that the Governor would be suspended, would not be able to perform his functions, this law on the Tribunal of State was enacted three months after the introduction of martial law in Poland. Let me underline that: the Act on the Tribunal of State was enacted three months, in March 1982, three months after martial law was imposed in Poland. This fact speaks volumes. I believe that, as soon as possible, this provision of the Act on the Tribunal of State should be eliminated from the Polish legal system by means of a proper complaint to the Constitutional Tribunal as being contrary to the law, to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, as well as to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

TVP: Thank you very much for the conversation. Professor Rafał Sura, Member of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski was with us. Thank you very much.

R. Sura: Thank you, madam, thank you all.

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Press conference of NBP Management Board (December 2023)

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Monetary Policy Council \| Members of the MPC

Position of the members of the Monetary Policy Council in respect to public statements concerning actions intended to remove the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski from office

According to Article 227 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the central bank of the State shall be Narodowy Bank Polski. It shall have the exclusive right to issue money as well as to formulate and implement monetary policy. Narodowy Bank Polski shall be responsible for the value of Polish currency. The organs of Narodowy Bank Polski shall be: the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski, the Monetary Policy Council as well as the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski.
The provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the legal acts of the European Union, which now constitute an integral part of the legal order of the Republic of Poland, namely the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFUE”) and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (“Statute”) establish rules which guarantee the independence of NBP.
As the Constitutional Tribunal states in its rulings, these rules are binding on all the bodies of the Polish state, including the legislature, imposing an obligation to make law whereby such rules are implemented and an obligation to prevent any attempts to undermine the rules by means of legislation or in any other way in which the public authorities may act.
It is of utmost importance that all the institutions and bodies of the state cooperate as best as they can. Such cooperation is not served well by creation of an atmosphere of threat or by putting pressure by announcing the application of procedures to change the composition of the management of such state bodies or institutions.
In this context, particular attention is drawn by the public discussion on holding the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski constitutionally accountable before the Tribunal of State. In our opinion, there are no formal grounds whatsoever for such considerations.
We state that allegations as to there being any obstacles in the flow of information between the Monetary Policy Council and the other organs of NBP as well as the organizational units and functions of NBP are false.
Decisions and arrangements concerning the functioning of the central bank, including the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, are made by the Monetary Policy Council and the Management Board of NBP, respectively. International financial institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are in agreement as to the appropriateness of the monetary policy implemented by NBP, which they have stated a number of times in their publications.
It should be noted at the same time that the Monetary Policy Council makes decisions collegially and the Governor of NBP is a member of the Council as its Chairman. The MPC makes decisions by way of resolutions adopted by the majority of votes – these are not personal decisions of the NBP Governor. Neither the Constitution of the Republic of Poland nor the Act on the Tribunal of State provides for the constitutional accountability of the members of the Monetary Policy Council, which means, among other things, that there are no grounds for holding anyone constitutionally accountable for joint actions made as part of this authority, to the extent of its collective mandate, including the actions of the NBP Governor as a member of the Council.
The allegations that the Chairman of the Monetary Policy Council arbitrarily decides on the wording of the minutes of the Council meetings are completely baseless. According to the Rules of the Monetary Policy Council, it is the Council that adopts the minutes by vote. The Chairman of the Council signs the minutes, but it should be emphasised that these are minutes previously approved by the Council by vote by all the Council Members present at the meeting in question. Any such allegations should be regarded as an expression of frustration caused by the fact that the Council did not accept a motion or motions concerning the wording of the minutes.
The Rules of the Monetary Policy Council state that minutes of the Council meetings are marked with a confidentiality clause. The application of confidentiality rules to information about the course of the MPC meetings is the result of arrangements made by the MPC of previous terms of office. We are in favour of this solution. First of all, this is justified by the provisions of the Act on the Protection of Confidential Information. Secondly, this solution remains an important condition for the members of the MPC to exercise their mandates, for it is one of the guarantees of the freedom of discussion and the presentation of all manner of views during the Council meetings. We share the view that it is a value which has been appreciated and protected throughout all the previous terms of office of the Monetary Policy Council. There is no reason to change this position.
Naturally, we realize that this solution may result in some difficulty in accessing the minutes, given the regulations concerning the protection of confidential information. In light of Article 4.1 of the Act of 5 August 2010 on Protection of Confidential Information (Journal of Laws 2023 item 756, as amended), confidential information may only be disclosed to a person who warrants that confidentiality will be preserved and only to the extent necessary for that person to perform their duties in the position held or to perform assigned tasks. It should be emphasised, however, that this does not prevent access to information about the decisions made during the MPC meetings for the members of the NBP Management Board nor any employee of NBP responsible for the given matter. Apart from that, all the decisions which generate the greatest public interest are announced and published. This is particularly the case of the Monetary Policy Council’s decisions on the interest rates and the results of voting on motions tabled during the meetings.
Referring to certain recent public statements, we must say that, owing to the role of NBP as the central bank and its influence on the functioning of the economy, the unjustified and baseless challenging of the authority of the NBP bodies may result in highly adverse consequences for the economic interests of the Republic of Poland and its citizens. This in particular includes such areas as the trust of foreign investors and Polish markets participants in the stability of the institutional economic environment in Poland as well as the perception of the Polish central bank as a member of the European System of Central Banks and other international financial institutions.
We urge everybody to exercise caution and not to take any hasty, unjustified steps. Apart from evaluations, which are typical of political journalism, no fact has been presented which may serve as the basis for constitutional accountability. If such action were to be taken, it would be an act without precedent in the world, certainly affecting the reputation of the Republic of Poland on the international stage. Political intentions cannot justify any action which could have such negative consequences for the interests of the Republic of Poland.

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Monetary Policy Council – Ireneusz Dąbrowski

When will inflation be back under control? “Next year will be the year of getting closer to the target” – TVN (19 November 2023)

An exchange of opinions with a rather petty background – this is how Professor Ireneusz Dąbrowski, member of the Monetary Policy Council, referred to the dispute between the member of the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski, Paweł Mucha and Governor Adam Glapiński. The “Facts after Facts” guest claimed that there was “not even a millimetre of reservations” about the NBP chief and announced that the inflation target could still be reached in 2024.

The professor was asked whether he agreed with the words of Adam Glapiński, who argued that the problem of inflation no longer existed. Dąbrowski indicated that he agreed with this assertion with one reservation. –“As of February this year, this sentence is indeed true. If we excluded January and February from our analysis, prices did not increase,” he argued.

“2024 will be the year of getting closer to the inflation target”

“In fact, prices have been stabilised for more than six months,” he added.

He also assessed that inflation in October at a level of 6.6 per cent was a “good result”. “This is a very good indicator. In February this year, this indicator stood at 18.4 per cent, i.e. there was a 12 percentage point bump in inflation. We have three points left to reach the inflation target,” he said.

“As an economist, I would say that 2024 will be the year of getting closer to the inflation target. I think that the target will be reached before the end of next year,” said the member of the Monetary Policy Council.

“In the case of the Governor of NBP, there is not a millimetre of reservation.”

The guest of “Facts after Facts” was also asked about the dispute at NBP. Professor Dąbrowski said he was “observing this discussion, this exchange of views”. He stated that it has a fairly “petty background”.

“One of the members of the management board simply has a different opinion regarding past practices at Narodowy Bank Polski (…). I was not a member of the management board, I do not know what the bonus system in the management board is. (…) In the case of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski, there is not even a millimetre of suspicion of him breaking the constitution or the laws. Even this whole discussion is about the regulations. This is a really trivial matter, blown out of proportion,” he said.

“I am not aware of any regulation, constitution or law that Governor Glapiński has broken. This needs to be made clear. These are all certain journalistic slogans, television news trickers.”

Conflict at NBP

The conflict at Narodowy Bank Polski has been loud since Wednesday, 8 November. At the time, NBP management board member, Paweł Mucha, published a statement and two letters in which he accused the head of NBP, Adam Glapiński, of failing to perform his duties and criticised the cooperation of the central bank authorities.

Among other things, Mucha stated that “at least some” of the NBP management board members are not given access to copies of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Council meetings.

In its response, the NBP Management Board stressed that Paweł Mucha’s conduct, “in particular the creation of an atmosphere of threat, settlements, conflict, unfounded attempts to impose exclusively his own point of view, unfounded criticism of colleagues and the Governor of NBP,” is unacceptable, like, “all other actions contrary to the Code of Ethics for Narodowy Bank Polski Employees.” As the central bank’s statement added, “contrary to the allegations raised by Mr Paweł Mucha, Member of the NBP Management Board, and despite the proceedings referred to in paragraph 1, the Management Board of Narodowy Bank Polski performs all tasks in an uninterrupted manner, effectively and in accordance with the law.”

A day later, Adam Glapiński said at a press conference that there was no conflict in the bank’s management board. According to the head of NBP, Paweł Mucha’s case is “trivial” because, as a member of the management board, he demands “exorbitant amounts” for his work, bonuses and rewards. “The way this work is done does not justify it in any way, the dispute is purely about awards,” assessed Governor Glapiński at the time.

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Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland

Do you not regret your involvement in making Adam Glapiński the Governor of NBP?

No, because I believe that the decisions made by Governor Glapiński on economic and financial matters in Poland, as well as those made by Governor Glapiński, the Monetary Policy Council, and Narodowy Bank Polski in the broad sense, are responsible and valid. And I disagree with all those who criticise the Monetary Policy Council and the Governor of NBP for decisions concerning interest rates and measures undertaken to fight inflation. I believe that the fight against inflation and the protection of the Polish economy during and after COVID has been conducted effectively, sensibly and justly.

Are there grounds to hold Governor Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State?

I know nothing of such grounds.

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The Polish Bank Association

“Ensuring proper financing is essential, and in Polish conditions, the responsibility will mainly fall on the banking sector. Meanwhile, the capacity of the banking sector is limited, and the industry’s problems are mainly attributed to legal and regulatory factors, as well as excessive fiscal and parafiscal burdens. It is also in the interest of the stability of the financial sector to ensure smooth and harmonious operating conditions, which will certainly not be facilitated by the destabilisation of the institutional system within the financial safety network,” the Polish Bank Association says in its statement.
The banking sector is facing a number of challenges and issues that call for a systemic approach. Ignoring them may lead to the destabilization of the financial system and a loss of the banking sector’s ability to finance social and economic enterprises.

The banking sector in Poland, measured by the level of assets in relation to GDP, is one of the smallest in the European Union – with a share of 90%, it only comes ahead of Lithuania. The average return on equity for the Polish banking sector in 2018-2022 stood at 4.7%, ranking us last in the region.

In terms of the cost-to-income ratio, Polish banks are at the bottom of the list, with a 2018-2022 average of 64% (only coming ahead of Hungary). This is a result of gargantuan tax and paratax burdens, which make up nearly 40% of banks’ operating costs (effective tax rate).

A significant portion of the burdens on Polish banks results from the costs of legal risk, increasing with the erosion of the legal system, which allows for the questioning of the validity of long-term agreements.

At the same time, the share of loans to the non-financial sector in GDP has been consistently decreasing towards pre-accession levels – the value of loans to the non-financial sector in relation to GDP currently stands at 35%, and it is projected to drop to 28% within two years. We entered the European Union with roughly similar levels.

Meanwhile, the investment rate in Poland stands at only 17%, compared to the EU average of 22.5%. Poland is facing the necessity of making substantial investments in energy transition, innovation, and human capital. They will require the involvement of the financial banking sector, for which there is no viable alternative in today’s Poland.

The stability of the Polish financial sector and its ability to finance the economy is contingent upon the implementation of a cohesive approach by regulatory bodies and financial safety network authorities, particularly:

conducting an audit of the banking sector’s burdens and taking actions to rationalise them;
continuation of systemic efforts aimed at ensuring the integrity of the WIBOR rate and the orderly completion of the reference rate reform;
statutory resolution of the issue of mortgage loans denominated in foreign currencies (Poland is one of the few countries where local statutory solutions have not been adopted);
systemic actions to ensure legal certainty of executed agreements and the development of a long-term model for the mortgage loan market;
refraining from undertaking sporadic, populist, economically unjustified initiatives, such as credit holidays, in favour of systemic solutions (Borrowers’ Support Fund).

Ensuring the stability of the financial sector requires effective cooperation of all participants in the Financial Stability Committee, which is established for macroprudential supervision and crisis management.

It is in the interest of the stability of the financial sector to ensure smooth and harmonious operating conditions, which will certainly not be facilitated by the destabilisation of the institutional system within the financial safety network.

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NBP reports

In connection with the information suggesting the possibility of dismissing the representative of the Republic of Poland, appointed by the Governor of NBP, from the World Bank Board of Directors, by another unauthorised body, Narodowy Bank Polski explains that according to Article 11(3) of the Act of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski, the Governor of NBP is exclusively responsible for representing the interests of the Republic of Poland in international banking institutions, including the World Bank and the EBRD. However, the Council of Ministers has the competence only to potentially nominate a representative of the Republic of Poland in international financial institutions.

The view that, “it is sufficient to amend the resolution of the Council of Ministers from 1986 – which divided responsibilities between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of NBP regarding the appointment of representatives to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – to change the rules for filling these positions,” is incorrect. In free Poland, these rules have acquired statutory force, which makes them superior to the regulation of the Council of Ministers adopted in the Polish People’s Republic. Article 11(3) of the Act of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski stipulates that, “The Governor of NBP shall represent the interests of the Republic of Poland within international banking institutions (…).” The World Bank is the first and largest international banking institution to which the aforementioned provision relates. This provision is explicit and does not provide for any conditions or exclusions.

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The NBP press office reports

Narodowy Bank Polski informs that the remuneration of the Governor of NBP constituted 27.6% of the average remuneration of the CEOs of the six leading commercial banks in 2022. The remuneration of the Governor of NBP, save bonuses, awards and 13th-month salary, would amount to PLN 283,788 in 2022, representing 6% in relation to the average remuneration of the CEO of a commercial bank.

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The NBP Legal Department reports

The NBP Legal Department reports that the Governor of NBP has exclusive competence to represent the interests of the Republic of Poland in international banking institutions, including the World Bank and the EBRD. These issues are regulated expressis verbis by Article 11(3) of the Act of 29 August 1997 on Narodowy Bank Polski:

“The Governor of NBP shall represent the interests of the Republic of Poland within international banking institutions, and, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise, within international financial institutions.”

This means that the Council of Ministers has the competence only to potentially appoint a representative of the Republic of Poland in international financial institutions.

The passing of the Act on NBP, which regulated the appointment of nominees to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, rendered the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1986 no longer applicable in the substantive scope.

Resolutions of the Council of Ministers and ordinances of the President of the Council of Ministers are not sources of generally applicable law. They constitute internal rules and regulations and only apply to organisational units subordinate to the governing body issuing such an act (Article 93(1) of the Constitution). Therefore, they cannot apply to NBP.

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Narodowy Bank Polski has received a number of supporting letters from Europe, including Bulgaria, Denmark, Romania, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary and the European Central Bank (ECB)

LETTER FROM CHRISTINE LAGARDE (ECB) TO THE NBP GOVERNOR NBP

Downloadable document (eng)

Downloadable document (pl)

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Prime Minister (until December 2023) Mateusz Morawiecki

MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI DURING PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE CHANCELLERY OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND – AS CITED IN 300POLITYKA (4 DECEMBER 2023)

If a ruling coalition or a ruling party after elections wished to make a change in the position of the Governor of NBP, it would simply bring them to trial before the Tribunal of State, as the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski, according to legal regulations, can be being brought before the Tribunal of State by a simple majority of votes. Therefore, it would be easily achievable for the coalition in charge as it is obvious that it has over 231 votes in the Sejm. Where would the constitutional provision on the independence of the Governor of NBP and the entire NBP stand, if it was easy to bring the Governor before the Tribunal of State? How would the constitutional principle of the independence of the central bank from political influence be exercised? I believe that everyone can answer this question for themselves – said Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki during a press conference at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.

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Lawyers – Professor Waldemar Gontarski

TVP INFO, POLSKIE RADIO – PROGRAMME:“W OTWARTE KARTY” – INTERIA BUSINESS (14 DECEMBER 2023)

Interview with Professor Waldemar Gontarski, lawyer, expert in European law and international law, regarding holding of the Governor of NBP accountable before the Tribunal of State.

M. Raczyńska: Professor, announcements, including those of Donald Tusk and his team, concerning the independence of Narodowy Bank Polski as well as the possible liquidation of public media, may have repercussions in Europe. Professor, let me ask you: what kind of potential consequences or repercussions may these actions bring?

Prof. W. Gontarski: I’m but a simple solicitor, not a lawyer, I’m not going to respond to that….

M. Raczyńska: But you’re also an expert in European law…

Prof. W. Gontarski: Yes, thank you. I have a postdoctoral degree, among other things, in the field of European Union law, but I don’t want to directly comment on the statements of politicians, because I’m neither a political scientist nor a politician. However, as an expert in EU law, I will say “yes”. The Treaty does not allow for what the Polish legislation on the Tribunal of State allows. Pursuant to the Polish Act on the Tribunal of State, the majority that formed the current government is sufficient to hold the Governor of NBP accountable, or as we say, to indict him.

M. Raczyńska: And do you, as a lawyer, see the reasons, the causes of this?

Prof. W. Gontarski: But wait a minute, let’s leave the reasons and the causes, and see what happens next. Then, the Governor will be suspended by the operation of the law, under the said Act. But pay attention! The Luxembourg Court of Justice and treaty law, by virtue of treaty law, it is evident that the Governor of Nardoowy Bank Polski, the governor of any central bank in a Member State of EU, regardless of whether that country is in the euro area or not, can be suspended, or even removed from their position, subject to a convicting judgement made by an independent court. And the Tribunal of State was established based on the Act of the beginning of 1982. The independence there [of the Tribunal] is as follows: a Polish citizen without a criminal record, one that is not employed in the government administration, can be a judge. In legal studies, we have been saying for a long time that this is a very anachronistic provision. In other words, it is intended to suspend the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski with a communist-era legal provision, which would translate into destabilisation of the financial sector in Poland and the EU alike. Because even if we are not in the euro area, we are part of the EU’s financial system. And the Luxembourg Court of Justice has already voiced its position on the matter of the central bank’s governor. Obviously, it wasn’t the Polish Governor, as the Tribunal hasn’t yet had an opportunity. Moreover, the treaty stipulates that if an attempt was made to suspend the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski from office, the Governor, in this case Professor Glapiński, would be personally entitled to lodge a complaint directly with the Court, the Luxembourg Court of Justice. Accordingly, the application of the Act on the Tribunal of State against the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski in the light of European Union law is impermissible. Pursuant to our Constitution, in the event of a conflict between treaty law and an ordinary legal act, treaty law shall prevail. A separate issue is that the Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law, but this matter is not governed by it, but rather by a communist-era legal act adopted under martial law. Let us call a spade a spade: by means of legislation dating back to the times of Jerzy Urban, there is a desire to dismiss or suspend the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski in sovereign Poland, and the political system in our country, let me remind those in favour of suspending or dismissing the Governor of NBP, that the last time the political system changed in Poland was on the last day of 1989, when the name of the state was changed by way of an amendment to the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic, and Article 1 included what is now in Article 2 – the principle of a democratic state under the rule of law. The Act on the Tribunal of State compares to the democratic state under the rule of law in the same way as a chair compares to an electric chair. The communist-area Act is obviously the electric chair.

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Lawyers – Professor Waldemar Gontarski

The parliamentary majority wants to remove the Governor of NBP. Professor Gontarski: This is contrary to Polish and EU law. The constitution is not a newspaper – wPolityce.pl (4 December 2023)

“The mere announcement of the “suspension” of the NBP Governor is clearly in breach of the EU Treaties, the Constitution and the Act on NBP. The governor of the central bank cannot be “suspended”, because he is a constitutional body, which as such must maintain its independence from the Sejm,” Prof. Waldemar Gontarski stated in an interview with the TVP Info portal.

The lawyer recommended that the opponents of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski familiarise themselves with the applicable treaty provisions.

“It follows from them that, based on the Tribunal of State, the NBP Governor can neither be suspended from his office nor dismissed and that announcements of dismissal only create a threat to financial stability,” he explains.

In its promises to be fulfilled in its first 100 days in government, the Civic Coalition included holding the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski, Adam Glapiński, accountable before the Tribunal of State. The leader of the new parliamentary majority repeatedly asserted this during the election campaign. The procedure to be followed in this case, as Donald Tusk himself said, is an appropriate parliamentary resolution. Holding Governor Glapiński accountable in this form, however, raises numerous objections.

Among those who do not like the Civic Coalition’s announcements is the lawyer, Prof. Waldemar Gontarski – Rector of the European School of Law and Administration (EULA). He stated in an interview with the TVP Info portal that the current parliamentary majority could hold the head of NBP accountable before the Tribunal of State. However, he added that for such a scenario to materialise, such a parliamentary majority is required which is needed in the so-called second constitutional step.

“And MPs have such a majority. However, they do not have the majority to charge ministers or the prime minister, and particularly the President, before the Tribunal of State,” the lawyer explained.

Paths for the removal of the NBP Governor

Professor Gontarski pointed out that, despite having an arithmetical majority in the Sejm, holding Governor Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State is further complicated by the European Union legislation. This is because it protects “in a special way” each of the heads of the central banks of the European Union Member States. According to Gontarski, Governor Glapiński’s security guarantees would be even greater if Poland were in the euro area. Even so, NBP “is an issuing bank of a Union member state anyway”, so its management is entitled to special protection.

“Even if we are not in the euro area, Poland’s financial stability is part of the financial stability of the whole Union. Therefore, in accordance with the EU Treaties, the European Central Bank and the national central banks, including Poland’s NBP, constitute the European System of Central Banks, and the statutes of the national central banks must provide, in particular, that the term of office of the Governor of the national central bank shall not be shorter than five years,” points out Professor Gontarski.

The Rector of the European School of Law and Administration assessed that, under EU rules, the Governor of NBP can only be removed due to a long-term serious illness or other condition resulting in permanent incapacity to perform his duties. Another gateway would be, according to Professor Gontarski, the admission of material misconduct by the central bank governor.

“The decision in this case can be appealed to the Court of Justice by the Governor himself. The Luxembourg Court would then have to deal with the case,” the lawyer added.

Will Glapiński be brought before the Tribunal of State?

The Rector of the EULA specified that the reasons for the dismissal of the governor of the central bank, according to EU regulations, are definitive. Serious misconduct by the Governor, as referred to in EU legislation, must be established beyond reasonable doubt by a final court judgement.

“As the German study of EU law points out, the dismissal of the governor on the grounds of serious misconduct “can only take place on the basis of conduct whose unlawfulness has been established by a final judgement of an (independent) court” and, as well known, the judges of the Polish Tribunal of State have limited independence. These are necessary EU measures to ensure the personal independence of the bank’s head from any influence of any authority. Therefore, I believe that ideas such as holding the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski accountable before the Tribunal of State mean playing with the EU law,” the expert adds.

Non-compliance with the legal regulations

According to Prof. Gontarski, the bullish announcements by politicians of the parliamentary majority that they will suspend the NBP Governor blatantly contradict the European Union Treaties, but also the Polish Constitution and the Act on Narodowy Bank Polski.

“Simply put, the Governor of NBP cannot be “suspended” because he is a constitutional body and, as such, must maintain independence from the Sejm. The announced action would be a personal attack on a particular office holder, but from a constitutional and EU and statutory point of view, it is not about the legal protection of a particular person, with a particular name, but about the office held by that person at a particular time,” he said.

The lawyer also pointed out the potential problems for the cohesion and status of the whole country if Donald Tusk’s plan were to materialise.

“The attacks against the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski by announcing that he would be held accountable before the Tribunal of State and “suspended” are already destabilising the Polish state,” he assessed.

“As a lawyer who analyses the situation on an ongoing basis, I have not seen information about any constitutional tort of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski before. Evaluations varied, but not of this type. It was only after the parliamentary elections that there was a multiplication, an eruption of these allegations,” he added.

Polish regulations

Professor Gontarski also pointed out that being held accountable before the Tribunal of State is possible as a result of a person violating the constitution or a law. Such premises, in his opinion, did not exist in the case of Governor Adam Glapiński.

“Please show me the specific articles of the Constitution, of any law or of Union law that the current Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski is alleged to have violated. Meanwhile, even the heads of parliamentary committees related to the new Sejm finances are saying publicly that they do not rule out the possibility of the NBP Governor being held accountable before the Tribunal of State and “suspended”. But they should realise that they harm the state with such statements. In formulating such allegations, they should point out what specific laws the NBP Governor allegedly violated, which they do not do. Here, a specific legal provision must be given, end of story, full stop. If someone does not cite specific laws, but makes such allegations, he or she is defaming, i.e. even violating the Penal Code,” the expert explained.

The lawyer noted that “the Constitution and the law are not a newspaper”, so no one without justification and a final court ruling can raise their hand against the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski.

“If it is claimed that a person holding the office of the Governor of NBP may be held accountable before the Tribunal of State, but without pointing to a specific provision of the law or the Constitution, then we are dealing with an attack on the state, damaging the state because Narodowy Bank Polski, in accordance with the Constitution, is a necessary part of the system of our state,” he added.

Narodowy Bank Polski is, in the opinion of Prof. Gontarski, part of the structure of the European Union and, more specifically, of the European System of Central Banks, as reflected in the EU Treaties.

“Let the opponents of the NBP Governor at least familiarise themselves with the treaty provisions, then we will talk. It follows from these provisions that, based on the Tribunal of State, the NBP Governor can neither be suspended from his office nor dismissed, and that announcements of dismissal only create a threat to financial stability,” he explains.

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Lawyers – Professor Hubert Izdebski

Fragment of the legal opinion of Professor Hubert Izdebski prepared for NBP – nbp.pl (5 December 2023)

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides for constitutional accountability before the Tribunal of State of, inter alia, the Governor of NBP – for violation of the Constitution or a law in connection with the position held or in the scope of office (Article 198(1)). In doing so, the Act on the Tribunal of State indicates that this responsibility covers acts by which the Constitution or a law has been violated, even if unintentionally (Article 3). There can be no doubt that constitutional liability does not extend to violations of acts such as the Monetary Policy Council Regulations or the NBP Management Board Regulations.

Constitutional liability (…), like criminal liability, is individual in nature and a person subject to such liability must be proven guilty, at least unintentionally, in order to be punished. As a consequence, the constitutional liability of the Governor of NBP for participating as chairperson of a collegiate body (in this case, the Monetary Policy Council and the Management Board of NBP, respectively) should be regarded as excluded.

The regulations of the Monetary Policy Council, due to both the executive nature of these regulations in relation to the Act on NBP and the scope relating to the mode of operation of the Council (…), cannot be treated as a source and therefore a basis for the exercise by members of the NBP Management Board of the right to obtain (copies of) the minutes of the Monetary Policy Council meetings – and especially the unconditional exercise of such a right. The admissibility of providing a particular member of the NBP Management Board with a copy of a given Monetary Policy Council meeting minutes should be determined in each such case on the basis of the criteria referred to in Article 4(1) of the Act on the Protection of Classified Information in conjunction with § 11(4) in fine referring to § 12(3) of the Monetary Policy Council Regulations.

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Lawyers – Professor Anna Łabno

Wprost Business (4 December 2023)

“In my opinion, the attacks against the NBP Governor have no substantive basis. The head of the central bank is liable for culpable violation of the Constitution and laws. Not politically, but legally liable. He must be proven to have culpably violated the Constitution or the laws,” says Prof. Łabno in an interview in “Wprost” magazine.
“The Constitution of the Republic of Poland gives protection to the Governor of the central bank, in addition one has to refer to EU regulations. The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU explicitly protects the independence of the head of the central bank, e.g. it considers it impermissible for the apparatus of power to order the governor to carry out certain actions, to give instructions, to indicate the policies he or she would be expected to follow. Likewise, it is ruled out that the governor is guided in his activities by instructions presented by the authorities. For the activity of the central bank governor to be correct, he or she must benefit from independence. His independence is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Act on NBP and European law. The governor cannot belong to a political party or a trade union,” he adds.
“The legislation stipulates that the term of office of the head of the national bank must be at least five years. In Poland, the term of office is six years. The idea is to make the length of this term fundamentally different from that of the Sejm. Although the Governor of NBP is elected by the parliamentary majority, this majority is always subject to electoral change during his term of office. This is one of the forms through which the governor’s independence is guaranteed,” the constitutionalist stresses.
“Such allegations need to be proven. From a legal point of view, the situation is unambiguous. Please note that the Governor of NBP does not take decisions individually, he acts on the basis of decisions taken by a collegiate body such as the NBP Management Board or the Monetary Policy Council. In any legal assessment, this argument must appear,” says Prof. Łabno.
“If the committee decides to make the governor accountable before the Tribunal of State, it presents the relevant proposal to the Sejm, the Sejm adopts a resolution by an absolute majority with half of its members present. Only then – according to the provisions of the Act on the Tribunal of State – is a suspension automatically triggered,” explains the constitutionalist in an interview with our editorial.
The expert points out that a legal problem will emerge here. “The provision that refers to the automatic suspension is contrary to our Constitution because it violates the independence of the NBP Governor. It could even be argued that, in a political sense, it anticipates the recognition of the legitimacy of the charges against the Governor. What we have here is a remnant of a previous era (the Act on the Tribunal of State dates from 1982, when we had a completely different system of government). It is also contrary to the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Statute of the European Central Bank and the central banks affiliated to the EU,” explains Prof. Łabno.
“Here we have a very clear independence of the NBP Governor, not only protected by our constitution, but also by the statute of the European Central Bank. There is a clear regulation in the statutes of this bank that requires the state to recognise and legally protect the independence of the CEO,” he adds.
“The constitutionalist stresses that in the event of suspension, Glapiński will be able to appeal to international institutions. “We have a precedent case concerning the head of Latvia’s central bank, which happened five years ago. There, there is no institution of suspension, but a temporary ban on holding office was applied. The Governor complained and the CJEU agreed with him, finding that there had been a violation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, as well as of the Statute of the European Central Bank,” explains Prof. Łabno.
“Such a situation (suspension) must not be allowed. This would be even worse than depriving the Governor of NBP of his post altogether. The state of suspension puts us in a situation of extreme uncertainty, as it is unknown and difficult to predict what kind of policy the central bank will pursue. It is not only a question of directly protecting the independence of a particular person, it is also a question of protecting the institution of the bank, and if it is a bank, then it is a question of protecting the state’s finances, the state budget and the state’s monetary policy. The consequences of such decisions certainly lead to destabilisation,” he adds.

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Lawyers – Professor Marcin Matczak

For some reason, the PiS assault on the rule of law has succeeded – Wyborcza.pl (9 November 2023)

How about resetting the Tribunal, moving the NBP Governor out by force, putting TVP into liquidation? And we will have the law abused again. But after all, we are doing it for a good purpose and they were doing it for a bad purpose!

Opinions published on our site express the views of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editors

We all suffer from the Mother Pawlak syndrome from the Polish film “Sami swoi” [All Friends Here]: the court is the court, law is law, but justice must be on our side. And to achieve that, you need something more powerful than the law and the courts. Something akin to a grenade given to Pawlak by his mother. A symbol of the fact that, in the end, naked power is what counts.

How did this syndrome develop? It started in the 1990s with the manipulation of the law. I do not analyse the times of the Polish People’s Republic, because back then the communist state made laws that expressed foreign, Russian values. People circumvented this law to realise justice as such, which was an obvious moral choice. It was then that the most Polish word took on a positive overtone: “kombinować” [wangle/get creative]. But after 1989 it was possible to trust that something was changing, that the gap between our law and our morality had narrowed, that it was no longer necessary to circumvent the law in order to be fair. But no – individual ambition won out, the law was the law, but justice had to be on President Wałęsa’s side. Accordingly, Professor Falandysz lectured it to be so.

At the time, Lech Morawski, the one who later became a “double” in the Constitutional Tribunal, strongly suspected that this new law was far from justice. That the new Constitution is a tool of the post-communists, a smokescreen for their disreputable interests, and that the protection of vested rights is in fact the protection of stolen rights. And when someone proclaims that the letter of the law is to be applied without moral correction, they are proclaiming a false doctrine. When the professor heard “Dura lex sed lex”, he must have wondered why this hardness of the law should be endured and whether it is sometimes hard because it is unjust and there is no value in fidelity. So you always have to check whether it leads to justice, and if it doesn’t, you have to kombinować. Because only the stupid follow orders – the wise judge for themselves whether it’s worth it.

Then the first Law and Justice government came, and with it an even greater conviction that the law must be bent to one’s own understanding of what is fair. Jaroslaw Kaczyński spoke of “legal impossibilism” – that annoying feature of the law that prevents you from doing what you would like to do, even when you think it is good for Poland. And he was, after all, always sure that he knew what was good for Poland and did not want any formalities in the materialisation of that good to get in his way. At the time, Ludwik Dorn wanted to conscript doctors into the army and thus instrumentalise the law – a tool he, as head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was given to protect the common good (the announcement of mobilisation), to use in order to break the doctors’ strike. So he wanted something that was certainly good. But only for his party.

When the PO-PSL majority in 2015 appointed surplus judges to the Constitutional Tribunal – TK), it was also about getting justice on the right side. So that the TK should rule well, not badly, once PiS wins. This event escapes us in the shadow of this autumn of the Middle Ages, which was later organised by the Law and Justice Party. However, it shows that manipulating the law takes revenge like missed opportunities in football. If you show that the law is invalid because you are circumventing or manipulating it in order to achieve a more important interest, the other party will immediately tell you that it has such an interest too and that it is also more important than the law, because why not.

The rule of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) was a time when, according to Kornel Morawiecki’s slogan, the welfare of the nation, personally defined by the elderly gentleman in the Nowogrodzka cabinet, constantly stood above the law. If the constitution got in the way, it was wrong and immoral. If it helped, as Krystyna Pawłowicz gutted it and stuffed it with new content, it became good and moral. As the opposition challenged the appointment of the three “doubles”, Ziobro challenged the appointment of three judges back in 2010. The signal was clear: if you use the law to pursue your interest, we will use it to pursue ours just as much or three times as strongly. Because the law is only okay if justice is on the right side as a result.

For some reason, PiS’s assault on the rule of law succeeded. Public acceptance of this came from somewhere. Perhaps because the law has long since become a plaything, because we have always treated it not as a reservoir of the common good, but as a tool for realising the good of one of the warring groups?

And we see it again – the President applies the constitution on the appointment of the government in such a way that, coincidentally, it is compliant with the interests of PiS. It is just somehow not very apparent how the designation of Mateusz Morawiecki as Prime Minister serves the common good. After all, if the President staffed an ambulance in this way, he would be entrusting it to someone who has no chance of obtaining a driving licence and completing a crew, but would probably still argue that he is doing it for the welfare of the patients. This time “dura lex sed lex” does not get in the way, precisely because it gives political comfort.

Well, after all, it’s about to end, isn’t it? The rule-of-law-loving opposition won the election, so unconditional respect for the law will blossom. And the court will be the court, and the law the law no matter whose side justice is on?

But how about resetting the Constitutional Tribunal, because the Constitution is the constitution, but justice must be on our side? NBP Governor will be removed by force, because after all, a court is a court, but sometimes there is simply no other choice but to throw a grenade. Instead of appointing a government in a normal, constitutional way, it will kombinować and use a constructive vote of no confidence for a purpose for which it is not intended. And finally, the law will be orchestrated and TVP will be put into liquidation so that a commissioner can be appointed, just as PiS once wanted to do with the receivership in Warsaw.

And we will have the law abused instead of respected again. But after all, we are doing it for a good purpose and they were doing it for a bad purpose! The problem is that they think exactly the opposite. And I don’t put an equal sign between Law and Justice and the opposition – on the contrary, I would finally like to see a difference: that the law and the state pursue the common good, not the good of one party. And that the law should be the law and the court should be the court, even when justice is not on our side.

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Lawyers – Professor Witold Modzelewski

WE THE CITIZENS CANNOT AFFORD ANOTHER “WAR AT THE TOP” – FORSAL (15 DECEMBER 2023)

“The groundless holding of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski accountable before the Tribunal of State can bear unpredictable consequences for the stability of the monetary system and even for public finances,” says Professor Witold Modzelewski.

Do you think that holding Professor Adam Glapiński accountable before the Tribunal of State – considering this in the context of the state interests and the independence of the central bank – is a good idea?

One should recall the circumstances that gave birth to this idea. These circumstances undermine the credibility of its initiators. In a democratic state, where one of the fundamental duties of the political class is to respect the law, certain boundaries cannot be crossed, even in the heat of the political campaign. And we were astonished to hear the opposition politicians discussing the idea of a forced ‘removal’ of the incumbent central bank governor. These words disgrace our political system and question the legitimacy of election programmes that dispay plebeian radicalism.

Let me remind you that physically ‘removing’ anyone from their office does not deprive them of their statutory powers. Since this physical ‘removal’ produces no legal effects, the idea of using a formal procedure was put forward.

Can it even be applied?

To apply it legally, it would be necessary to present evidence of the commission of a prohibited act by the person whom one intends to indict in the first place. Out of fundamental respect for the law, especially Narodowy Bank Polski’s constitutional status, we should hear the charges and their legal substantiation. We have not had the opportunity to hear them so far, save for the economic and generally superficial criticism of the actions taken by a different institution, namely the Monetary Policy Council.

Under these circumstances, the constitutional independence of the central bank is obviously compromised in a systemic sense, which also undermines confidence in the legality of the actions carried out by the public authorities.

Continued under video

How could the actions taken against the central bank governor affect the stability of the financial system? What political and economic consequences would such actions produce? What about investment confidence?

The reaction of financial markets to events of this nature can be very dangerous and also very costly for citizens. After all, it is about the value of the Polish złoty, namely the value of our assets.

The groundless holding of the Governor of NBP accountable before the Tribunal of State can entail unpredictable consequences for the stability of the monetary system and even for public finances. This may result in very significant consequences for which we will have to pay dearly. An attempt to remove a central bank governor from office for political reasons undermines the economic credibility of the country by making it unpredictable to investors.

Do you believe that the actions of the Governor of NBP, Narodowy Bank Polski and the Monetary Policy Council were in line with the principle of independence, or can political influences be perceived in the decisions made?

Accusations of ‘political motives’ regarding the conduct of, aptly named, ‘monetary policy’ are downright absurd. First of all, the claim of falling under influence must be proven and, secondly, its effects must be detrimental to the goals of monetary policy.

The monetary policy pursued in recent years has had many critics, but also a large number of supporters.

Monetary policy is criticised in a harsh and often exaggerated manner by experts and stakeholders alike. A large discrepancy in the assessments is normal, not only in our country. However, professionalism, consistency and efficiency are at the core of the correctness of the central bank’s monetary policy. If it achieves its purpose, and this is primarily to curb inflation, then the allegations of presumed ‘falling’ to some ‘influence’ bear no legal significance. If the central bank performs its duties effectively, acting in good faith and in the public interest, political criticism of these actions has no relevance to proceedings before the Tribunal of State.

Is suspending the Governor of NBP at the time of filing a motion to bring him before the Tribunal of State in line with the rule of law and democratic standards?

The provision on the suspension of a person holding an official position already at the time of filing a motion to hold them acountable before the Tribunal of State raises fundamental concerns not only under Polish law and procedural rules, but also under EU law. Can the law deprive a central bank governor, who is an essentially independent entity, of the ability to perform their statutory duties simply because a specific procedure has been initiated? Where, after all, is the presumption of innocence that applies? This would constitute a disguised form of release from office, which is incompatible with EU law and, above all, with the by-laws of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank.

If you were to identify the main arguments for and against bringing the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State, what would they be?

In fact, we do not know any substantive arguments for initiating these proceedings. We only know the political motives, but these are not and should not be relevant to these proceedings. On the other hand, the arguments against the groundless initiation of this procedure are systemic and derive from the nature of the legal order, the imperative to respect the Constitution, the principles of EU law, the systemic independence of the central bank and finally, the dignity of state institutions, which should not act without legal justification.

How do you perceive the allegations of politicisation of the incumbent Governor of NBP compared to previous Governors? Could you name specific examples?

This allegation is beyond comprehension. As a general rule, the governors of NBP are politicians, former presidents of the council of ministers, ministers, leaders of political parties or those who have co-chaired political parties in the past. Politicians who, after completing their term as the Governor of NBP, remained in the political circulation. This is characteristic not only of the Polish political scene. Monetary policy is first and foremost ‘policy’ and the allegation of ‘politicisation’, whatever that word means, is unsubstantiated. I don’t understand what ‘depoliticised’ politics is.

Which of the specific protective measures taken by NBP internationally would you consider most effective in preserving the stability of the Polish financial system?

In my opinion, the most important actions have been and will be those within the European System of Central Banks. This institution has also been established to safeguard the independence of EU central banks. The case law of the CJEU, which has already addressed threats to the independence of central banks in the past, may also be relevant. The well-known and widely discussed Latvian example should be thoroughly analysed before mistakes are made that could cost us a lot as a whole.

Professor Adam Glapiński has come under heavy criticism for actions taken under most unusual circumstances.

Indeed, we have experienced an aggregation: the catastrophe that was the overnight shutdown of most companies on the pretext of COVID-19, the war beyond our border and, naturally, high inflation as a result of the trade war between East and West.

Did NBP respond appropriately to these crises?

The actions carried out by our central bank were within the limits of its statutory powers and pursued feasible goals. Could it have been done differently? The differences in opinions really come down to a sequence of actions. Besides, an important part of the so-called independent forecasts, including inflation in Poland, didn’t come true. Even the ‘hawks’ of monetary policy admit that greater radicalism in interest rate policy may only produce anti-inflationary effects in the future.

I believe that NBP has cooperated with other central banks within the European System of Central Banks in a manner compatible with the public interest and for the benefit of the Polish currency. The years 2020-2023 have been extraordinary. External crises have been destabilising the monetary and financial systems of EU countries and the central banks of these countries have not always behaved in a consistent manner. The measures taken in our country were, in principle, relevant to the existing threats and sufficiently effective.

How do you rate NBP’s information policy?

I am not an expert in this field, but I believe that the communication of the central bank governor with the citizens, markets and with hostile political opposition are all different things. The media space is dominated by the third discourse, which also has some Polish splash of colour. I would call on everyone to exercise more restraint. Any criticism of the central bank’s actions should be factual and as professional as possible, without wrongheadedness or hostility. However, everyone should be united by the need to defend the value of the Polish currency and the public interest. In Poland, as always, an example – whether good or bad – is more important than words.

Do you see the necessity to adapt NBP’s actions to the changing economic and geopolitical situation? How should the central bank respond to potential future crises?

The geopolitical, strategic, and macroeconomic situation will keep changing. We should reassess incorrect forecasts and be able to change our stance when Poland’s interests so demand. The central bank, within the limits of its competences, must act consistently and should not be drawn into political games. We the citizens cannot afford another “war at the top”.

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Lawyers – TSUE

CJEU case law: independence of national central bank governors is subject to special protection – PAP (Polish Press Agency) (29 November 2023)

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union implies that the independence of national central bank governors is subject to special protection. The press office of the CJEU, in the information sent to PAP, draws attention to the 2019 opinion and judgement concerning the head of the Latvian central bank.

On 21 October in the Polish Sejm, the Civic Coalition (KO) leader, Donald Tusk said that the opposition had a majority to hold NBP Governor, Adam Glapiński, accountable before the Tribunal of State. “At the moment we have a majority sufficient to hold the NBP Governor accountable before the Tribunal of State. We are analysing this issue because we want to use this very serious disciplinary tool responsibly to hold politicians and top officers politically, sometimes also criminally, accountable,” Tusk stressed.

In response, Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, said he would speak to representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Central Bank to draw their attention to the fact that the announcements made by Donald Tusk and the Civic Coalition, are “the biggest attack on central bank independence”.

PAP asked the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg whether the CJEU has ever ruled on cases involving EU central bank governors before and whether there are EU rules on central bank governors?

In response, the Court’s press office stipulated that the CJEU has not had many opportunities to rule on the interpretation of EU law as it applies to the governors of the central banks of the Member States. However, it drew attention to the judgement of 26 February 2019 regarding the suspension of the head of the Latvian central bank. It refers to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB, which states that the governor of a national central bank may be relieved of his or her office only if he or she no longer fulfils the conditions necessary for the performance of his or her functions or has committed serious misconduct.

In a case from almost five years ago, the Court annulled a decision suspending the governor of the central bank of Latvia. Latvia, he argued, had failed to provide evidence of the serious misconduct that Ilmārs Rimšēvičs was alleged to have committed.

As part of the investigation against him for corruption and paid patronage, the Latvian anti-corruption agency applied a number of measures against Rimšēvičs, including a ban on him performing his duties as central bank governor, an obligation to provide an asset surety and a ban on him leaving the country without prior authorisation.

Complaints against these decisions were lodged with the CJEU by both the person concerned and the European Central Bank. In the preface to the judgment, the CJEU stated that these were the first actions brought before the CJEU on the subject of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB “to hear actions against decisions to relieve from office the Governors of the central banks of the Member States”.

“The conferring of that jurisdiction on the Court is intended to guarantee the independence of the governors of the national central banks, who are certainly national authorities but who act within the framework of the ESCB. Where those governors are at the head of a central bank of a Member State whose currency is the euro, such as Latvia, they also sit on the Governing Council of the ECB,” the CJEU stressed.

The CJEU press office also drew attention to the opinion of CJEU Advocate General Juliane Kokott preceding the judgment.

The German lawyer pointed out that “it is inevitably linked to the positions of members of the EU institutions and to the highest public positions in the Member States that the holders of these positions are not subject to any hierarchical control nor can they be dismissed for reasons relating to the exercise of their functions.”

“Consequently, repressive powers to punish a possible abuse of power by a person occupying such a position are generally vested either in the institution to which he or she belongs or in another institution of equivalent status in constitutional terms,” the opinion reads.

Furthermore, Kokott stressed that, “even without attempting to define exhaustively the prerequisites for being a central bank governor, it must be said that independence is in any case their inviolable core.”

“… the independence of the ESCB national central banks, as well as of the members of the Governing Council of the ECB, as the main decision-making body of the ECB and of the Eurosystem, is enshrined in the TEU as an indispensable factor for price stability, which is the primary objective of the economic and monetary policy of the Union and of the ESCB. For this reason, Article 130 of the TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB expressly provide that the members of any decision-making body of the ECB and national central banks, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, shall neither seek nor take instructions from any body,” she explained.

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Lawyers – Grzegorz Pastuszko, PhD, DSc

Constitutionalist on the possibility of suspending the NBP Governor by a resolution of the Sejm: I consider such a solution unconstitutional – PAP (Polish Press Agency) (30 November 2023)

“I consider the suspension of the NBP Governor at the moment when the Sejm adopts a resolution to hold him accountable before the Tribunal of State to be an unconstitutional solution,” the constitutionalist from the University of Rzeszów, Grzegorz Pastuszko, PhD, DSc said.

Donald Tusk, the candidate for the Prime Minister and the leader of Civic Platform, announced that there was a majority in the Sejm for holding the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski accountable before the Tribunal of State. In order for Adam Glapinski to face the Tribunal of State, 115 MPs must submit a motion to the Marshal of the Sejm and then vote on it. In the case of the Governor of NBP, an absolute majority of the statutory number of MPs is sufficient. The new parliamentary coalition will have this many votes.

Pastuszko stressed – in response to questions from PAP – that the institution of suspension is regulated in the current legal state by the Act of 26 March 1982 on the Tribunal of State. “In its light, the suspension takes place as soon as the Sejm adopts a resolution to hold the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski constitutionally accountable before the Tribunal of State. The first chamber of the Polish parliament decides here by an absolute majority in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of members,” he explained.

“I consider such a conceived statutory solution to be unconstitutional. My opinion stems primarily from the fact that its existence creates an unknown formula for the subordination of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski to the Sejm, which is unknown to the current Constitution,” assessed the constitutionalist from the University of Rzeszów.

As he stressed, “under such conditions, the Sejm, which has the right to suspend [the Governor of his duties], gains the possibility to exert political pressure on Narodowy Bank Polski (facilitated by the aforementioned requirement of an absolute majority), and this undoubtedly in conflict with the principle of the independence of this institution.”

“I think that the legislator should ensure as soon as possible that this flawed construction disappears from the Polish legal order. This would succeed in restoring a constitutionally compliant state, while removing a relic of the distant past,” the constitutionalist claims.

He recalled that the institution of suspending an organ held constitutionally accountable before the Tribunal of State was first introduced under the legislation of the Polish People’s Republic, i.e. within the framework of a state system different from that of today. “At the time,” Pastuszko stressed, “the Sejm was the supreme body, with all other state organs subordinate to it.”

“Its preservation under the regime of the Third Republic was the result of a historically entrenched habit which – I have no doubt about it – is worth finally abandoning. This is particularly necessary with regard to the suspension of the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski,” he stressed.

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Lawyers – prof. Ryszard Piotrowski

The new parliamentary majority wants to hold the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski, Adam Glapinski, accountable before the Tribunal of State. And the Tribunal would have him stripped of his power at the central bank. Professor Ryszard Piotrowski believes that the NBP Governor cannot be suspended, as this would be unconstitutional – Business Insider (29 November 2023)

As the portal recalls, Donald Tusk, the candidate for prime minister and the leader of Civic Platform, announced that there was a majority in the Sejm for holding the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski accountable before the Tribunal of State. In legal terms, it is possible. In order for Adam Glapinski to face the Tribunal of State, 115 MPs must submit a motion to the Speaker of the Sejm and then vote on it. In the case of the Governor of NBP, an absolute majority of the statutory number of MPs is sufficient. The new parliamentary coalition will have this many votes.

“A resolution of the Sejm to hold a person accountable results in the suspension of the person concerned. This is where the obstacles begin,” the portal reports.

Professor Ryszard Piotrowski, a constitutionalist from the University of Warsaw, has no doubt that the Governor of NBP cannot be suspended. “The Governor of NBP is a constitutional body that must maintain its independence from the Sejm. This independence is very closely linked to the fact that the Governor of NBP should not be guided in his activities only by the interests of the parliamentary majority. So while the Governor may be indicted before the Tribunal of State, this does not mean that the President can be suspended from office. The Governor of the central bank is not a person who can be suspended from office under the Act on the Tribunal of State,” explains Prof. Piotrowski. And he adds that neither the Constitution nor the Act on NBP provides for such an institution as the suspension of the Governor.

Business Insider recalls that Article 227 of the Constitution states that the Governor of Narodowy Bank Polski is appointed by the Sejm at the request of the President of the Republic of Poland for six years. The organisation and operating principles of NBP and the detailed rules for the appointment and dismissal of its bodies are laid down by law. The Act on NBP states that the Governor of NBP can be dismissed, among other things, if the Tribunal of State has ruled against him or her to be prohibited from holding executive positions or functions involving special responsibility in state bodies.

The portal reported that there was a claim in NBP that the very law on the Tribunal of State giving the possibility to suspend the Governor may be unconstitutional. “Perhaps the President or a group of MPs should refer this matter to the Constitutional Court,” states one interviewee.

However, according to Professor Piotrowski, whether such an application will be granted depends on how it is structured. “The Constitutional Court considers applications concerning the constitutionality of a law. Someone would therefore have to point out that the Act on the Tribunal of State, insofar as it allows for the suspension of the Governor of NBP indicted before the Tribunal of State, is unconstitutional. The application would therefore have to relate to the allegation of the unconstitutionality of the Act on the Tribunal of State. The Constitutional Court could then pronounce on the matter,” explains Prof. Piotrowski. (PAP)

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Lawyers- dr Michał Skwarzyński, PhD

Radio Maryja (23 November 2023)

“The Tribunal of State is not a body to which someone is accountable because it is a political decision. A quasi-prosecutorial, pre-trial investigation must be carried out. Only afterwards – as far as Mr Glapiński is concerned, by a simple majority, and as far as ministers are concerned, by a qualified majority – should the vote be taken by the Sejm. This is not strictly political accountability, but for the most serious political violations, i.e. violations of the Constitution. Such violations would have to be demonstrated. The argumentation that is raised at the moment as to accountability to the Tribunal of State is a wishful and political activity in isolation from both the Constitution and the Act on the Tribunal of State,” Dr Michal Skwarzyński pointed out.
The lawyer pointed out that Civic Platform was using a political argument to show its electorate that it was trying to do something because it had promised to hold the people from PiS to account. In his view, however, this is not supported by the law.

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Lawyers – Dr hab. Robert Suwaj (constitutionalist)

LEGAL OPINION ON THE EVALUATION OF THE NBP GOVERNOR’S ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL AND PUBLIC ACTIVITIES THAT COULD COMPROMISE THE DIGNITY OF HIS OFFICE.

Downladable document (PL)

Downloadable document (ENG)

Lawyers – Dr hab. Robert Suwaj (constitutionalist)

Super Express (30 listopada 2023 r.)

Jest to z zasady mocno skomplikowane w przypadku działań organów kolegialnych (wieloosobowych), szczególnie jeśli ocena ekonomiczna tego kierunku działań została następczo potwierdzona podobnymi działaniami innych banków centralnych. W tego typu przypadkach niezbędne są pogłębione analizy ekonomiczne, które też wcale nie muszą przesądzać o celnych prognozach i-ostatecznie – o słuszności działań NBP. Szczerze przyznam, że – póki co – nie spotkałem się z takim zarzutem stawianym Prezesowi Glapińskiemu, który by uzasadniał uruchomienie wobec niego procedury wstępnej przed Trybunałem Stanu.

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Prawnicy – prof. Andrzej Zoll (konstytucjonalista)

Prof. Zoll o postawieniu szefa NBP przed Trybunałem Stanu: przyjęcie bezwzględną większością jest zupełnie wystarczające – TVN 24 (4 grudnia 2023 r.)

– Mam bardzo poważne wątpliwości, czy w ogóle Trybunał Konstytucyjny jest organem, który ma załatwiać indywidualne sprawy – mówił w “Faktach po Faktach” profesor Andrzej Zoll o wniosku PiS do TK w związku z zamiarem postawienia Adama Glapińskiego przed Trybunałem Stanu. Profesor twierdzi, że wymóg sejmowej bezwzględnej większości do postawienie szefa NBP przed trybunał jest “zupełnie wystarczający”. Były prezes Trybunału Konstytucyjnego mówił też o możliwościach nowego Sejmu w sprawie odwołania dublerów w tej instytucji.

Postawienie przed Trybunał Stanu prezesa NBP Adama Glapińskiego znalazło się w “100 konkretach na pierwsze 100 dni rządów” Koalicji Obywatelskiej. Jak zapisano w programie, szef banku centralnego miałby zostać pociągnięty do odpowiedzialności za “zniszczenie niezależności Narodowego Banku Polskiego i brak realizacji podstawowego zadania NBP, jakim jest walka z drożyzną”.

Mateusz Morawiecki ocenił, że “nawet sugestie” o postawieniu prezesa NBP przez Trybunałem Stanu są próbą wywarcia nieuzasadnionej presji na niezależność banku centralnego. – Prezes Narodowego Banku Polskiego według przepisów podlega postawieniu przed Trybunałem Stanu zwykłą większością głosów, więc bardzo łatwo byłoby koalicji, która zawiązuje rząd, postawić (Adama Glapińskiego – red.) przed Trybunał Stanu. Gdzie wtedy byłby konstytucyjny zapis o niezależności prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego i całego Narodowego Banku Polskiego? Jak mogłaby być realizowana konstytucyjna zasada niezależności Banku Centralnego od wpływu polityków? – wypowiadał się na ten temat Morawiecki.

Zoll: mam poważne wątpliwości, czy TK jest organem, który ma załatwiać indywidualne sprawy

PiS składa do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego wniosek o zbadanie zgodności z konstytucją ustawy o Trybunale Stanu, dotyczącym pociągnięcia do odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej prezesa NBP.

– Mam bardzo poważne wątpliwości, czy w ogóle Trybunał Konstytucyjny jest organem, który ma załatwiać indywidualne sprawy. Nie bardzo się orientuję, na jakiej podstawie konstytucyjnej taki wniosek był oparty. Bo to, że niezawisłość jest zagrożona ze względu na konieczność uzyskania bezwzględnej większości (do postawienia przed Trybunałem Stanu – red.), to jest za mały argument (…) Ten wniosek jest oparty o polityczne argumenty – mówił były prezes Trybunału Konstytucyjnego.

“Przyjęcie bezwzględną większością jest zupełnie wystarczające”

Według profesora Zolla zastrzeżenia polityków PiS w związku z wymogiem większości bezwzględnej są nieuzasadnione. PiS zaznacza, że może to doprowadzić do sytuacji, kiedy każdy kolejny Sejm będzie mógł w ten sposób odwoływać kogoś, kogo będzie chciał.

– Jak są argumenty za uznaniem, że jest naruszony przepis konstytucyjny przez funkcjonariusza publicznego, to wniosek przygotowany przez większość bezwzględną wystarczy. Oddaje się sprawę do niezawisłego Trybunału Stanu i to on rozstrzygnie, czy było naruszenie konstytucji czy nie. Uważam, że przyjęcie tutaj bezwzględną większością jest zupełnie wystarczające – mówił prof. Zoll.

Gość “Faktów po Faktach” odniósł się także do innego zastrzeżenia PiS, które dotyczy zawieszenia prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego. – W powszechnym sądownictwie też osoba oskarżona jest zawieszona. Bardzo często funkcjonariusz jest zawieszony z pełnienia swego urzędu. Jeśli nie zostanie skazany, łączy się to z rekompensatą finansową za okres zawieszenia. Nie widzę tutaj (w przypadku postawienia przed TK Glapińskiego – red.) naruszenia konstytucji z powodu takiej regulacji. Jeśli są postawione takie zarzuty przez bezwzględną większość parlamentarną, to jednak wymaga to odsunięcia takiej osoby na czas rozstrzygania sprawy od pełnienia urzędu – twierdzi. […]

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Ekonomiści – prof. Mariusz Andrzejewski

Redaktor: Czy jest podstawa do postawienia Adama Glapińskiego przed Trybunałem Stanu? – Polsat News (4 grudnia 2023 r.)

Marian Noga: Podstawa jest to znaczy upolitycznienie Rady Polityki Pieniężnej, Narodowego Banku Polskiego to po pierwsze. Po drugie, nieumiejętna walka z inflacją, czego najlepszym dowodem jest to, że cel osiągniemy poza horyzontem średniego okresu. Czyli ostatni raport o inflacji, który wszyscy znają z listopada pokazuje, że my osiągniemy cel dopiero w 2026 roku, a najpóźniej powinniśmy osiągnąć w połowie 2025 roku. Po prostu działanie Narodowego Banku Polskiego było niezgodne z prawem. Jeżeli w ogóle rozlepia się banery na banku, że my działamy zgodnie z prawem i to ma być argument, że Narodowy Bank Polski działa zgodnie z prawem. Przecież to woła o pomstę do nieba.

Panie prof. Andrzejewski, podpisałby się pan pod wnioskiem polityków czy raczej pod tą argumentacją zarządu NBP?

Mariusz Andrzejewski: Chciałbym powiedzieć, że absolutnie nie podpisałbym się pod wnioskiem polityków. Również nie zgadzam się z argumentacją, która została przed chwilą przedstawiona przez pana profesora Nogę. Chcę pokazać art. 220 konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, który jest jako jedyny, gdyby został złamany może być podstawą prawną do postawienia przed Trybunałem Stanu Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego, który jest organem tego Narodowego Banku Polskiego. Tak uważam, dlatego, że społeczeństwo i słuchacze nie mają prawa wiedzieć o takim drobnym szczególe polegający na tym, że w tym artykule jest powiedziane, że ustawa budżetowa nie może przewidywać pokrywania deficytu budżetowego przez zaciąganie zobowiązania w Centralnym Banku Państwa. Zatem doszłoby do możliwości postawienia Prezesa NBP przed Trybunałem Stanu, gdyby Narodowy Bank Polski wykupił obligacje rządowe. Tak się nigdy nie stało, więc powstaje pytanie, kto wykupił w owym czasie te 200 miliardów zł emisji obligacji? Banki komercyjne, po prostu rynek i to są fakty. W związku z powyższym jest art. 48 ustawy o Narodowym Banku Polskim, który mówi, że Narodowy Bank Polski może sprzedawać i kupować dłużne papiery wartościowe w operacjach otwartego rynku. Tak też stało Szanowni Państwo, mianowicie robicie Narodowy Bank Polski nie objął obligacji rządowych, czego mu nie wolno było zrobić, a skupił na rynku otwartym od tych banków komercyjnych, które wcześniej objęły właśnie te obligacje, aktywa, jako operacje otwartego rynku. Do tego jak najbardziej miał prawo. Wszystkie inne argumenty które, bo mają być ponoć podstawą są właśnie pięknie skonkludowane przez panią Prezes Polskiego Banku Centralnego. Wyraźnie stwierdziła, że absolutnie nie ma takich podstaw, dlatego, że Europejski Bank Centralny przez wiele lat dokonywał, także takich samych operacji na szeroką skalę po kilkadziesiąt miliardów miesięcznie skupował obligacje. Decyzje w tych sprawach były podejmowane przez zarząd NBP, te uchwały były podejmowane przez decyzje kolegialne. W związku z powyższym należałoby domagać się równego traktowania, jeżeli ktoś z tego tytułu postawić prezesa NBP przed Trybunałem stanu to należałoby postawić wszystkich członków zarządu przed Trybunałem Stanu. Nie doszło do żadnego złamania prawa, ani Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.

Marian Noga: Polska podpisała traktat wejścia do Unii Europejskiej. Tam wyraźnie pisze, że integralną częścią tego traktatu jest statut europejskiego systemu banków centralnych, do których należy Polska. Tam jest wyraźnie napisane w tym traktacie, że żadne osoby trzecie nie mają prawa wpływać na decyzję banku centralnego kraju należącego do Unii Europejskiej. Panie profesorze Andrzejewski, widział pan w telewizji jak samochodem pan Adam Glapiński jechał na ulicę Nowogrodzką po wskazówki. Zapytać się jakie ma podjąć decyzje. Cały świat to widział w telewizji. Pan i pana środowisko nie uznaje Unii Europejskiej. Dla pana to nie jest problem, że został złamany traktat o funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej przez pana Glapińskiego. Jak pan słucha konferencje pana Glapińskiego. To pan słyszy jak on w każdej konferencji mówi, pluje na strefę euro. Prerogatywą rządu jest zmiana reżimu kursowego i wejście do strefy euro, a nie jest to prerogatywa NBP. I ile razy Prezes o tym mówił tyle razy złamał prawo.

Mariusz Andrzejewski: Nie jest tak, że nawet tak wspaniały pan profesor Noga o tak wielkim dorobku naukowym, doświadczeniu w Radzie Polityki Pieniężnej ma prawo do wydawania wyroków o tym, że ktoś złamał traktat. Absolutnie się z tym zgadzam. Stoimy na stanowisku, że prawo powinno być przestrzegane, a nie stoimy na stanowisku, że ktoś może powiedzieć dajcie mi władzę to wyprowadzę tego gościa z Narodowego Banku Polskiego. To jest hucpa polityczna, to jest taka gangsterka polityczna. To nie jest postępowanie zgodnie z prawem, a jakiekolwiek dalsze wypowiedzi, które szkalują dobre imię i uderzają w niezależność Narodowego Banku Polskiego są właśnie nie na miejscu, bo osłabiają polską gospodarkę. Ja jestem jak najbardziej za uznawaniem wyroków TSUE. Natomiast mogę mieć krytyczne zdanie na temat takich wyroków jak np. o zamknięciu elektrowni w Turowie z którym się po prostu nie zgadzam. Panie profesorze proszę sobie darować wycieczki w moją stronę. Zajmijmy się problemem.

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Stefan Kawalec

Glapiński before the Tribunal of State? It would be a very dangerous precedent – Wyborcza.pl (27.11.2023 r.)

Suspension of the Governor of NBP Adam Glapiński by a motion to the Tribunal of State would not repair, but would further destroy the state.

Opinions published in our service express the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the editorial board

Stefan Kawalec is the president of the consulting company Capital Strategy, a member of the Association of Polish Economists (TEP), and a former deputy minister of finance.

As public statements show, the new parliamentary majority is analysing the possibility of bringing the Governor of NBP Adam Glapiński before the Tribunal of State, which would automatically suspend him from his duties. This would be a dangerous step leading to depriving Poland of an independent central bank. If the parliamentary majority seeks to repair the institutions of the democratic state rather than destroy them, it should rather repair the defective Act on the Tribunal of State.

Serious accusations can be made against Governor Glapiński. He can be criticised for publicly proclaiming that interest rates would be low for a very long time, which misled many borrowers and exposed them to problems, while interest rates later rose significantly. He can be accused of hindering the functioning of the Monetary Policy Council, limiting its members’ access to NBP’s analytical materials. He can be blamed for the politicisation of the central bank and using public appearances in the pre-election period to support the then ruling party by attacking the opposition. Finally, we can analyse whether and to what extent the monetary policy that he controls was subordinated to political motives and the desire to increase support for the government coalition led by Law and Justice (PiS).

However, in an article titled “Bringing the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State more and more likely” (Business Insider, 22 November 2023), Rafał Hirsch points out that proving in black and white that Adam Glapiński violated the constitution or the [respective] act will not be easy. One could reply that it is precisely in such a complicated situation that the procedure of the so-called constitutional proceedings specified in the Act on the Tribunal of State should be used in order to comprehensively examine the case, resolve it and draw consequences.

The launch of the constitutional proceedings is technically straightforward. According to the aforementioned act, 115 deputies can submit a so-called preliminary motion to the Marshal of the Sejm to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State. If the motion is formally correct, the Marshal refers it to the Sejm’s Constitutional Accountability Committee. The committee carries out proceedings with the participation of the witnesses and submits a report to the Sejm, recommending that the accused be brought before the Tribunal of State or that the case be dropped.

If the Sejm adopts a resolution to bring the accused before the Tribunal, the Tribunal of State conducts the proceedings by applying the appropriate judicial procedure set out in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Tribunal acts as a court of both first and second instance. In the case of an appeal, the case at second instance is heard by a different panel of judges. The judgment of the Tribunal of State in the second instance is not subject to appeal or cassation.

For violations of the Constitution or the act, the Tribunal of State may order the removal of the accused from office, as well as a prohibition from holding certain offices in the future, the loss of active and passive electoral rights, and the withdrawal of orders and decorations.

Procedure contrary to the principle of central bank independence

On closer examination, however, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that the procedure for prosecution laid down in the Act on the Tribunal of State is, in the case of the Governor of NBP, contrary to the principle of independence of the central bank, which stems from the Constitution and is confirmed by international agreements. This is due, in my opinion, to the simultaneous existence of three findings:

1. The very act of bringing the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State (and not a final verdict of his guilt by the Tribunal) results, according to the law, in his suspension from duties.

2. A resolution of the Sejm to refer the case to the Tribunal of State, resulting in the immediate suspension of the Governor of NBP, may be adopted even if the Constitutional Accountability Committee finds that there are no grounds for prosecution and, in its report, proposes to discontinue the proceedings.

3. The resolution on holding the Governor of NBP accountable before the Tribunal of State is adopted by the Sejm by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of deputies, which means that the minimum number of votes sufficient to adopt the resolution is, depending on the number of deputies present, between 116 and 231. It is worth noting that bringing a member of the government (prime minister or minister) before the Tribunal of State requires a much higher number of votes – namely a three-fifths majority of the statutory number of deputies, which means that, regardless of the number present, at least 276 deputies must vote in favour of such a motion. In the case of the President, holding him or her accountable before the Tribunal of State requires a resolution of the National Assembly (in other words the Sejm and the Senate sitting jointly), adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the statutory number of members of the National Assembly.

Therefore, this means that if the parliamentary majority is determined to remove the Governor of NBP, it can always do it. All that is required is to formulate a motion fulfilling the formal requirements, the support of 115 deputies, and then referral by the Marshal of the Sejm to the Constitutional Accountability Committee. Next, even if the Committee decides that there are no grounds for prosecution and requests in its report that the proceedings be discontinued, the parliamentary majority may vote to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State. The Governor of NBP is then suspended from his duties and faces two-instance court proceedings, the duration and outcome of which is unknown.

The provisions of the Act on the Tribunal of State may provide an incentive to initiate proceedings against the Governor of NBP, not with a view to bringing about a final ruling quickly, but primarily with a view to causing suspension from office for an indefinite and prolonged period of proceedings before the Tribunal. This would be analogous to the widely criticised practice often applied to politicians, entrepreneurs, and managers, against whom the prosecution formulates a charge, introduces preventive measures such as arrest or bail and passport retention, and then nothing happens for months or years and often an indictment is not even filed in court.

Using the current provisions of the Act on the Tribunal of State and causing the suspension from duties of the Governor of NBP would set a precedent that undermines in practice the independence of the central bank. Any future Governor of NBP would be vulnerable to pressure and threats of such a procedure being applied to him or her if he or she is not suitably submissive to the ruling majority.

The Constitutional Tribunal on the banking commission of inquiry

It is worth recalling here a telling episode from 17 years ago. In 2006, the Sejm, in which the PiS-led coalition had a majority, set up the so-called banking commission of inquiry. The commission intended to investigate various aspects of the activities of NBP and summoned the Governor of NBP, who was Leszek Balcerowicz at the time, for questioning. The scope of the activities of the banking commission of inquiry was then challenged in the Constitutional Tribunal by a group of deputies who felt that it threatened the independence of the central bank.

Governor Balcerowicz said that he would not appear before the commission unless the Constitutional Tribunal found its scope of activities to be lawful. Balcerowicz said that if he did appear before the commission, any future Governor of NBP would face the possibility of being harassed with hearings before the commission of inquiry. This would create a mechanism of constant pressure, undermining NBP’s ability to defend the value of the currency.

The dispute was finally settled by a judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 September 2006, which confirmed the legitimacy of the objections of the complainant deputies and the then Governor of NBP. In the justification of the judgment, the Constitutional Tribunal stated: “Except in strictly defined cases, parliament does not have a position of supremacy over other bodies. Such a construction, which is part of the system of constitutional democracy, was created, inter alia, in order to avoid an understanding of democracy as the omnipotence of the parliamentary majority.”

The Tribunal recalled that, in light of Article 95 of the Constitution, the Sejm exercises control over the operation of the government administration, while it has no such powers in relation to Narodowy Bank Polski. The Tribunal stated: “Although the Constitution does not explicitly formulate the principle of independence of Narodowy Bank Polski (NBP), this rule follows implicitly from Article 227 of the Constitution. Indeed, the performance of the tasks entrusted to NBP requires independence.”

The Tribunal noted that the principle of central bank independence is also set out in international agreements: the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the Sejm does not have the right to exercise control over NBP and the Governor of NBP through a commission of inquiry. The Constitutional Tribunal noted that the Governor of NBP could be held accountable before the Tribunal of State, but did not analyse the constitutionality of the proceedings set out in the Act on the Tribunal of State, as this was not the subject of the motion submitted to the Constitutional Tribunal at the time.

How to fix a flawed law

Today, if we had a Constitutional Tribunal functioning in accordance with the law and having the moral authority, a motion could be submitted to examine the compatibility of the Act on the Tribunal of State with the Constitution and international agreements on the issue of central bank independence. However, the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal has unfortunately been largely devastated.

The question remains: should the parliamentary majority use this situation as an opportunity to act in a way that could permanently undermine the foundation of an important institution, which is Narodowy Bank Polski? I would suggest that the Act on the Tribunal of State be repaired instead so that it does not conflict with the principle of central bank independence. First of all, the threshold of the number of votes needed to pass a resolution of the Sejm to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State should be raised. It is difficult to justify logically and appears to be unconstitutional that significantly fewer votes are needed in the Sejm to bring the Governor of NBP to the Tribunal of State, i.e. the head of an independent institution over which the Sejm has no supreme position, than in the case of a prime minister or minister, i.e. representatives of the government administration over which the Sejm exercises a direct control function. It would be logical to assume that a two-thirds majority of the statutory number of deputies is needed to bring the Governor of NBP before the Tribunal of State, i.e. the same majority as is needed in the National Assembly to bring the President before the Tribunal of State.

I believe that using the provisions of the current Act on the Tribunal of State to suspend from duties the Governor of NBP would not repair, but would further destroy the state. At the same time, I believe that the Sejm can and should fix this flawed law.

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Dziennikarze \| Redakcje – Wyborcza.pl

Glapiński jest beznadziejnym szefem NBP, ale lepiej go nie ruszać – Wyborcza.pl (26.11.2023 r.)

Wobec Adama Glapińskiego można wysuwać mnóstwo uzasadnionych zarzutów. A jednak nie zachwyca mnie pomysł postawienia go przed Trybunałem Stanu i odwołania ze stanowiska.

Opinie publikowane w naszym serwisie wyrażają poglądy osób piszących i nie muszą odzwierciedlać stanowiska redakcji

Powiedzieć, że Adam Glapiński jest złym prezesem Narodowego Banku Polskiego, to nic nie powiedzieć. Okazał się niekompetentnym ekonomistą, gdy wiosną 2020 roku ostrzegał przed deflacją, gdy za rogiem czyhała rosnąca skokowo inflacja. Wielokrotnie swoimi wypowiedziami i czynami ośmieszał bank centralny – jedną z najlepiej funkcjonujących instytucji, jaką udało się stworzyć w III RP. Gdy w 2021 roku dobiegała końca jego pierwsza kadencja, departament komunikacji NBP wydał kuriozalny komunikat, w którym oskarżał jakieś ciemne siły, że się na NBP, a w szczególności na jego prezesa, uwzięły, a ich celem jest storpedowanie drugiej kadencji prezesa. Glapiński wczuł się w wojenny nastrój panujący w szeregach rządzącej partii i w komunikacie deklamował: „Zapomina się jednak o tym, że w czasach zawirowań: ataków czy wojny, to pracownicy banku centralnego należą do najodważniejszych urzędników walczących o przetrwanie państwowości i niepodległość”.

Na konferencji prasowej chwalił się zakupionym przez NBP złotem i sztabkę kruszcu podnosił do góry jak olimpijczyk złoty medal. Sugerował opinii publicznej, że polska waluta ma oparcie w złocie, co oczywiście jest nieprawdą. Jego konferencje, zwłaszcza podsumowujące posiedzenia Rady Polityki Pieniężnej, przypominają kabaret, co doskonale sparodiował komik Robert Górski.

Glapiński jest apolityczny tylko w teorii. Kierowany przez niego bank robił wszystko, by pomagać rządowi PiS. Jeszcze przed wybuchem wielkiej inflacji Rada Polityki Pieniężnej starała się utrzymać wzrosty cen powyżej celu inflacyjnego, bo to dawało rządowi dodatkowe dochody do budżetu. W grudniu 2020 roku NBP starał się obniżyć kurs złotego (do czego Biuro Prasowe banku przyznało się na Twitterze), by w sztuczny sposób zawyżyć zysk, który zasila dochody budżetu. Wiosną 2020 roku bank zaczął skupować rządowy dług, finansując w pośredni sposób wydatki rządu.

Prezes zachowywał się jak PiS-owski propagandysta. Na gmachu NBP kazał powiesić wielki baner z napisem: „Obciążanie NBP i rządu winą za wysoką inflację to narracja Kremla”.

Na konferencji prasowej stwierdził, że „jest ogromna presja ze strony jednego z naszych sąsiadów, żeby wprowadzić w Polsce euro. Żeby Polskę wprowadzić do strefy euro. I żeby Polska uczestniczyła w budowie tzw. państwa europejskiego (…). Ten kraj ma pełne prawo podejmować działania, którymi stara się skłonić czy naprowadzić nas na tę ścieżkę (…). Może przysłać do nas jakiegoś swojego wysłannika, że tak powiem, który będzie w tym kierunku pracować”.

To było powtórzenie PiS-owskich prymitywnych kłamstw o spisku Niemiec, których wysłannikiem jest Donald Tusk i które przez wprowadzenie w Polsce euro chcą nas zniewolić. Ta kuriozalna wypowiedź (a było ich więcej) całkowicie zdyskredytowała Glapińskiego w oczach poważnych finansistów i inwestorów, a obecna argumentacja jego współpracowników, że rynki finansowe negatywnie zareagują na próbę zawieszenia czy odwołania prezesa, są mało wiarygodne.

A jednak nie zachwyca mnie pomysł postawienia Adama Glapińskiego przed Trybunałem Stanu i rozpoczęcia procedury jego odwołania. Uważam, że przyniesie to więcej szkody niż pożytku. Właściwie jedynym pożytkiem będzie to, że nie będziemy co miesiąc oglądali kabaretowych występów prezesa. Ale w samym NBP niewiele się zmieni.

Kto zająłby miejsce Glapińskiego?

Procedura usunięcia Adama Glapińskiego z NBP byłaby następująca. Komisja odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej, w której posłowie koalicji szykującej się do przejęcia władzy, mają większość, przedstawiłaby Sejmowi sprawozdanie wraz z wnioskiem o pociągnięcie Adama Glapińskiego do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu. Uzasadnieniem byłoby włączenie się prezesa w kampanię na rzecz PiS, na co jest wiele dowodów, w tym wywiady prezesa. Sejm uchwałę w tej sprawie przyjąłby z łatwością, głosami koalicji, a zapewne także Konfederacji. To spowodowałoby zawieszenie prezesa.

Jego funkcje przejęłaby pierwsza wiceprezes – Marta Kightley, pracująca wcześniej, podobnie jak Adam Glapiński, w Katedrze Ekonomii Politycznej i Historii Myśli Ekonomicznej SGH. Pani Kightley jest zatem wieloletnią znajomą prezesa, do której Glapiński ma zapewne zaufanie. Rzadko się wypowiada publicznie i nie znamy jej poglądów na politykę pieniężną. Nie będzie to miało zresztą większego znaczenia, gdyż politykę prowadzi Rada Polityki Pieniężnej, której sześciu członków (większość) to byli (?) politycy PiS lub urzędnicy, których na wysokie stanowiska państwowe mianowano w czasach rządów PiS. Ta większość popisała się brakiem profesjonalizmu. Kolejne projekcje inflacji sporządzane przez analityków NBP pokazują, że inflacja nie obniży się do poziomu celu inflacyjnego do końca 2025 roku, a mimo to RPP przegłosowała w ostatnich miesiącach obniżki stóp, w tym zaskakującą obniżkę o 0,75 pkt proc. we wrześniu. Dalszych obniżek raczej nie będzie, gdyż inflacja, sztucznie zaniżona przez manipulacje cenami paliw, teraz wzrośnie. RPP nie będzie też pomagała rządowi Tuska, co może mieć zresztą dobre skutki dla walki z inflacją.

Czy Marta Kightley będzie przewodniczyła Radzie? Prawnicy nie są co do tego zgodni. Dla samych decyzji Rady nie będzie to miało zresztą większego znaczenia, choć spowoduje duży zamęt w samej Radzie, łącznie z podważaniem przez niektórych prawników decyzji RPP. Oczami wyobraźni już widzę ogłoszenia kancelarii adwokackich, zachęcające kredytobiorców do procesowania się z bankami, z uzasadnieniem, że oprocentowanie kredytów (pośrednio zależne od decyzji RPP) jest nieprawidłowe.

PiS i tak będzie kontrolować NBP

NBP przynajmniej do końca kadencji Andrzeja Dudy pozostanie bastionem PiS. W skład zarządu banku wchodzi poza Adamem Glapińskim i Martą Kightley jeszcze sześć osób, których większość to byli działacze PiS lub osoby z nim blisko związane (między innymi wieloletni druh Kaczyńskiego Adam Lipiński, były poseł i minister prezydenta Paweł Mucha, były poseł i minister finansów Paweł Szałamacha, były szef ABW Piotr Pogonowski, były sędzia Trybunału Stanu i członek RPP wybrany przez PiS-owską większość w Senacie Rafał Sura.

Prezes NBP mógłby zostać odwołany dopiero po orzeczeniu wobec niego przez Trybunał Stanu zakazu zajmowania kierowniczych stanowisk lub pełnienia funkcji związanych ze szczególną odpowiedzialnością w organach państwowych. Jeżeli Trybunał zdążyłby z orzeczeniem przed upływem kadencji Andrzeja Dudy, prezydent wysunąłby zapewne kandydata na nowego prezesa nieakceptowanego przez Sejm i w dalszym ciągu bankiem rządziłaby Marta Kightley.

Trybunał Stanu nie jest apolitycznym, niezawisłym sądem

Trybunał Stanu jest specjalnym sądem. Jego członkowie są mianowani przez Sejm, a ich kadencja mija wraz z końcem kadencji Sejmu. Składa się z przewodniczącego, dwóch zastępców przewodniczącego i 16 członków wybieranych przez Sejm spoza grona posłów i senatorów. Zastępcy przewodniczącego Trybunału oraz co najmniej połowa członków Trybunału Stanu muszą mieć kwalifikacje wymagane do zajmowania stanowiska sędziego. Przewodniczącym jest pierwszy prezes Sądu Najwyższego – obecnie Małgorzata Manowska.

Obecny skład TS został wybrany na pierwszym posiedzeniu Sejmu. Siedmiu członków zgłosił PiS, sześciu – Koalicja Obywatelska, dwóch PSL, a Polska 2050, Lewica i Konfederacja – po jednym. Koalicja ma więc większość i może podjąć decyzje niekorzystne dla Glapińskiego, zapewne wbrew stanowisku Małgorzaty Manowskiej i sędziów zgłoszonych przez PiS.

Taki rozkład głosów będzie sugerował, że decyzja Trybunału została podjęta z motywów politycznych i tak to będą tłumaczyli politycy i propagandyści PiS. Przeciwko Glapińskiemu przemawia wiele spraw – wypowiedzi, wywiady, spotkania w siedzibie PiS z Jarosławem Kaczyńskim, zła współpraca z niektórymi członkami RPP i zarządu NBP, pośrednie finansowanie wydatków rządu. Czy to wystarczy, by uznać, że złamał konstytucję lub prawo? Sprawa dyskusyjna. W konstytucji jest zapisane: „Ustawa budżetowa nie może przewidywać pokrywania deficytu budżetowego przez zaciąganie zobowiązania w centralnym banku państwa”. To nieprecyzyjny zapis, łatwy do obejścia. Ustawy budżetowe za rządów PiS nie przewidywały zaciągania zobowiązań w NBP. Bank centralny kupował obligacje od banków komercyjnych.

Lepiej wygaszać zimną wojnę domową

Gdyby w Polsce istniał niezależny i apolityczny Trybunał, opowiadałbym się za tym, by obiektywnie ocenił działalność Glapińskiego i wydał sprawiedliwy wyrok. Jeżeli jednak Trybunał Stanu, w którym większość (co wynika z konstytucji) ma zawsze rządząca koalicja, ma stać się narzędziem usuwania teoretycznie nieusuwalnych urzędników państwowych, to przyniesie to więcej szkody niż pożytku.

PiS rozmontował fundamenty prawne państwa i w wielu instytucjach, w tym w NBP, niesłychanie zaniżył standardy moralne i merytoryczne. Odbudowa fundamentów będzie bardzo trudna. Jeżeli nowa koalicja pójdzie na skróty, a za cztery lata przegra wybory, PiS zburzy kruchy ład prawny. Mając większość w Trybunale Stanu usunie nie swojego prezesa NBP i postawi przed Trybunałem nielubianych przez siebie polityków.

Koalicja powinna szukać przynajmniej z częścią obozu prawicy kompromisu, by osłabić napięcia i uniknąć niszczącej zimnej (oby nie gorącej) permanentnej wojny domowej – nawet wbrew emocjom części elektoratu partii, które stworzą rząd.

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Press – Busienss Insider

Glapiński nie do ruszenia. Konstytucjonalista nie ma wątpliwości – Business Insider (29 listopada 2023 r.)

Nowa większość sejmowa chce postawić Adama Glapińskiego, prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego, przed Trybunałem Stanu. W ten miałaby go pozbawić władzy w banku centralnym. Prof. Ryszard Piotrowski uważa jednak, że prezesa NBP nie można zawiesić, bo byłoby to sprzeczne z konstytucją. W Business Insider tłumaczy dlaczego.

Uchwała Sejmu o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności powoduje zawieszenie w czynnościach osoby, której dotyczy
Zdaniem prof. Ryszarda Piotrowskiego prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego nie można jednak zawiesić uchwałą Sejmu
W efekcie Trybunał Konstytucyjny może rzucić koło ratunkowe dla Adama Glapińskiego

Donald Tusk, kandydat na premiera i lider Platformy Obywatelskiej, zapowiedział, że w Sejmie istnieje większość dla postawienia przed Trybunałem Stanu prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego. Prawnie jest to możliwe. By Adam Glapiński stanął przed TS, 115 posłów musi złożyć wniosek do marszałka Sejmu, a potem go przegłosować. W przypadku prezesa NBP wystarczy bezwzględna większość przy ustawowej liczby posłów. Tyle głosów będzie miała nowa koalicja parlamentarna. Uchwała Sejmu o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności powoduje zawieszenie w czynnościach osoby, której dotyczy. Tu zaczynają się schody.

Czy prezesa NBP można zawiesić?

Prof. Ryszard Piotrowski, konstytucjonalista z Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, nie ma wątpliwości, że prezesa NBP nie można zawiesić. Dlaczego?

— Prezes NBP jest organem konstytucyjnym, który musi zachowywać niezależność od Sejmu. Ta niezależność jest bardzo ściśle związana z tym, aby w swojej działalności prezes NBP nie kierował się tylko interesami większości parlamentarnej. Zatem choć może nastąpić postawienie prezesa w stan oskarżenia przed Trybunałem Stanu, to nie oznacza, że można go zawiesić w urzędowaniu. Prezes banku centralnego nie jest osobą, którą w świetle ustawy o Trybunale Stanu można zawiesić w urzędowaniu – tłumaczy prof. Piotrowski. I dodaje, że ani konstytucja, ani ustawa o NBP nie przewiduje takiej instytucji jak zawieszenie prezesa.

Artykuł 227 konstytucji mówi, że prezes Narodowego Banku Polskiego jest powoływany przez Sejm na wniosek Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej na sześć lat. Organizację i zasady działania NBP oraz szczegółowe zasady powoływania i odwoływania jego organów określa ustawa. Ustawa o NBP mówi, że prezes NBP może zostać odwołany m.in., jeśli Trybunał Stanu orzekł wobec niego zakaz zajmowania kierowniczych stanowisk lub pełnienia funkcji związanych ze szczególną odpowiedzialnością w organach państwowych.

Koło ratunkowe w Trybunale Konstytucyjnym

Jak pisał Bartłomiej Godusławski we wtorek w Business Insider, w NBP pojawiła się teza, że sama ustawa o Trybunale Stanu dająca możliwość zawieszenia prezesa może być niezgodna z konstytucją. — Być może prezydent lub grupa posłów powinna skierować tę sprawę do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego — twierdzi jeden z rozmówców.

Czy taki wniosek może zostać rozstrzygnięty tak, jak oczekuje prezes NBP? — To zależy, jak będzie skonstruowany — wyjaśnia prof. Piotrowski. — Trybunał Konstytucyjny rozpoznaje wnioski dotyczące zgodności ustawy z konstytucją. Ktoś musiałby wskazać więc, że ustawa o Trybunale Stanu w zakresie, w jakim dopuszcza zawieszenie w czynnościach urzędowych prezesa NBP postawionego w stan oskarżenia przed TS, jest niezgodna z konstytucją. Wniosek zatem musiałby dotyczyć zarzutu niezgodności z konstytucją ustawy o Trybunale Stanu. Wtedy TK mógłby wypowiedzieć się w tej sprawie — wyjaśnia prof. Piotrowski.

Trybunał Konstytucyjny zaczął pracować

A ostatnio Trybunał Konstytucyjny wziął się do pracy. 15 listopada orzekł o niekonstytucyjności tzw. emerytur czerwcowych. 30 listopada w pełnym składzie ma orzec w sprawie kar dla Polski. Rozprawa w tej sprawie odbyła się we wtorek, 21 listopada. Uczestniczyło w niej jedenastu sędziów, w tym dwóch z sześciu tzw. buntowników. Chodzi o Zbigniewa Jędrzejewskiego i Bogdana Święczkowskiego, którzy nie uznają prezesury Julii Przyłębskiej z powodu zakończenia kadencji. Wszystko zatem wskazuje, że nic nie stanie na przeszkodzie, by TK zajął się wnioskiem 50 posłów, prezydenta czy choćby jeszcze premiera Mateusza Morawieckiego w sprawie ustawy o Trybunale Stanu.

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Dziennikarze \| Redakcje – PAP

Do TK wpłynął wniosek posłów PiS o zbadanie konstytucyjności przepisów ustawy o TS; chodzi o pociągnięcia do odpowiedzialności prezesa NBP (opis) – PAP (1 grudnia 2023 r.)

Grupa posłów PiS wniosła do TK o zbadanie konstytucyjności niektórych przepisów ustawy o Trybunale Stanu, m.in. określającego większość wymaganą do postawienia przed TS prezesa NBP, a także przepisu stanowiącego, że osoba postawiona przez Sejm w stan oskarżenia zostaje zawieszona w czynnościach.

Do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego wpłynął wniosek grupy posłów PiS datowany na 29 listopada.

Wnioskodawcy chcą zbadania zgodności z konstytucją art. 11 ust. 1 zdania drugiego ustawy o Trybunale Stanu, który stanowi, że “Uchwała Sejmu o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu powoduje zawieszenie w czynnościach osoby, której dotyczy”. Chcą także zbadania zgodności tego przepisu w zakresie, w jakim odnosi się do prezesa NBP, z konstytucją, traktatem o UE i protokołem nr 4 do Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej w sprawie Statutu Europejskiego Systemu Banków Centralnych i Europejskiego Banku Centralnego.

Posłowie PiS chcą też, aby TK zbadał konstytucyjność art. 13 ust. 1a ustawy o Trybunale Stanu w zakresie, w jakim nie przewiduje większości kwalifikowanej w odniesieniu do postawienia w stan oskarżenia Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego. Zgodnie z tym artykułem uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego Sejm podejmuje bezwzględną większością głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów.
Jak napisano w uzasadnieniu wniosku posłów PiS, artykuł ustawy o TS, który “powoduje zawieszenie osoby, którą Sejm postawił w stan oskarżenia, nie może zostać uznany za zgodny z konstytucyjnym i unijnym standardem niezależności banku centralnego i jego prezesa, w sytuacji, gdy dotyczy Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego”.

Wnioskodawcy zwracają uwagę, że “uchwała o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przez Trybunałem Stanu może zostać podjęta także wobec Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego i to wyłącznie bezwzględną większością głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów (a więc, wystarczyć może 116 posłów), co ma istotne implikacje dla jego niezależności – która gwarantowana jest nie tylko przez Konstytucję RP, ale też prawo pierwotne Unii Europejskiej”.

Wątpliwości autorów wniosku, “budzi automatyczny skutek zawieszający osobę wskazaną w uchwale Sejmu w czynnościach, który następuje po podjęciu tejże uchwały przez większość (niekwalifikowaną) sejmową”. “Ustawa o Trybunale Stanu nie przewiduje w tym zakresie żadnych gwarancji procesowych osobie zawieszanej w czynnościach – nie określa maksymalnych granic czasowych zawieszenia” – wskazano. Dodano, że samą decyzję o zawieszeniu podejmuje nie organ sądowy lub podobny (jak Trybunał Stanu), a Sejm, będący ciałem stricte politycznym, który swoje decyzje opiera na przesłankach, które mogą mieć charakter arbitralny i doraźny” – ocenili.

Według wnioskodawców, “daleko idące wątpliwości pod kątem konstytucyjności budzi art. 13 ust. 1 a ustawy o Trybunale Stanu”, który stanowi, że uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego Sejm podejmuje bezwzględną większością głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów.

Jak czytamy w uzasadnieniu, chociaż intencją ustawodawcy było ustalenie większości na takim poziomie, “aby zapobiec instrumentalnemu wykorzystywaniu jej dla celów politycznych, to dojść należy do wniosku, że większość ta jest zbyt niska, aby uchronić tę procedurę od wpływów politycznych i stosowania celem wywierania wpływu na Prezesa i cały Narodowy Bank Polski, który powinien móc w sposób niezależny realizować swoje konstytucyjne kompetencje w zakresie polityki pieniężnej”.

Zwrócono uwagę, że “w kontekście odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu podkreślić należy, że podmioty, które mogą jej podlegać, w tym Prezes Narodowego Banku Polskiego, mają daleko idące, konstytucyjne gwarancje niezależności od każdej z trzech władz”. Oceniono, że mimo to “ustawodawca zwykły stworzył mechanizm, który zakłada, że większość, która będzie dysponowała co najmniej 231 posłami ( a w skrajnym przypadku nie musi być to nawet 231 posłów – wystarczające będzie 116!) może dowolnie postawić Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego przed Trybunałem Stanu”. Zdaniem wnioskodawców, “takie ukształtowanie tej procedury nie gwarantuje, wbrew wyraźnym intencjom ustawodawcy, uniezależnienia tej procedury od możliwości jej politycznej instrumentalizacji”.
O możliwości postawienia prezesa NBP Adama Glapińskiego przed TK mówił lider PO Donald Tusk 21 listopada. “W tej chwili dysponujemy większością głosów wystarczającą, aby postawić przed Trybunałem Stanu prezesa NBP. Analizujemy tę kwestię, bo chcemy w sposób odpowiedzialny używać tego bardzo poważnego narzędzia dyscyplinującego do odpowiedzialności politycznej, czasami też karnej polityków i funkcjonariuszy najwyższego szczebla” – podkreślił Tusk.

Wniosek w sprawie postawienia przed TS może złożyć w Sejmie prezydent lub co najmniej 115 posłów. Wniosek trafia do sejmowej komisji odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej. Komisja Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej przedstawia Sejmowi sprawozdanie z prac wraz z wnioskiem o pociągnięcie do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu lub o umorzenie postępowania.
Uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezes Narodowego Banku Polskiego Sejm podejmuje bezwzględną większością głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów.

Uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezes Rady Ministrów oraz członkowie Rady Ministrów Sejm podejmuje większością 3/5 ustawowej liczby posłów (276).
Koalicja Obywatelska, Trzecia Droga (PSL oraz Polska 250) oraz Lewica – mają w Sejmie łącznie 248 mandatów.

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Dziennikarze \| Redakcje – PAP

Do TK wpłynął wniosek ws. zgodności z Konstytucją ustawy o TS w obszarze odpowiedzialności prezesa NBP (dokumentacja) – PAP (1 grudnia 2023 r.)

Do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego wpłynął wniosek grupy posłów PiS o zbadanie zgodności z Konstytucją zapisów ustawy o Trybunale Stanu dotyczących pociągnięcia do odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej Prezesa NBP – podano w piątek na stronie TK. Wniosek wraz z uzasadnieniem załączamy do niniejszej depeszy.
Jednym z przedmiotów kontroli – jak podano w uzasadnieniu wniosku – jest przepis ustawy o SN, który mówi, że “z chwilą podjęcia przez Sejm uchwały o pociągnięciu konkretnej osoby do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu, osoba ta zawieszana jest w czynnościach związanych z wykonywaną funkcją czy stanowiskiem”.

Posłowie PiS chcą też, aby przedmiotem kontroli była “norma wskazująca większość głosów, która niezbędna jest do podjęcia uchwały Sejmu o postawieniu przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego”.

Wniosek w sprawie postawienia przed TS może złożyć w Sejmie prezydent lub co najmniej 115 posłów. Wniosek trafia do sejmowej komisji odpowiedzialności konstytucyjnej. Komisja Odpowiedzialności Konstytucyjnej przedstawia Sejmowi sprawozdanie z prac wraz z wnioskiem o pociągnięcie do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu lub o umorzenie postępowania.
Uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu m.in. Prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego Sejm podejmuje bezwzględną większością głosów (231) w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów.

Skutkiem przegłosowania w Sejmie wniosku o postawienie przez Trybunałem jest zawieszenie prezesa NBP w wykonywaniu jego funkcji, a jego obowiązki przejmuje wiceprezes Narodowego Banku Polskiego.
Przewodniczący KO Donald Tusk poinformował w piątek, odnosząc się do ewentualnego postawienia prezesa NBP przed TS, że jego formacja polityczna nie zrobi niczego, co by naruszyło stabilność, czy podważyło reputację państwa polskiego w Europie, za granicą.
Z kolei marszałek Sejmu Szymon Hołownia powiedział, że nad takim wnioskiem trzeba się poważnie zastanowić.

Obaj wskazali, że decyzja polityczna w sprawie TS dla Glapińskiego nadal nie zapadła.

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Dziennikarze \| Redakcje – TV Trwam

Dotyczy: wniosek PiS do TK o zbadanie zgodności z konstytucją ustawy o Trybunale Stanu w kontekście zapowiedzi „opozycji” postawienia Prezesa NBP przed TS

Prezenterka TV Trwam: Według informacji, do których dotarła nasza redakcja, do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego trafił wniosek o zbadanie zgodności z konstytucją ustawy o Trybunale Stanu. Ma to być odpowiedź polityków PiS-u na próby postawienia w stan oskarżenia prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego.

Reporter TV Trwam: Nowa sejmowa większość podtrzymuje przedwyborczy postulat dotyczący rozliczania rządów Prawa i Sprawiedliwości. Jedno z pierwszych działań ma być wymierzone w prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego, profesora Adama Glapińskiego, co zapowiedział w ubiegłym tygodniu przewodniczący PO Donald Tusk.

Donald Tusk, przewodniczący PO: W tej chwili dysponujemy większością głosów wystarczającą, aby postawić przed Trybunałem Stanu prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego.

Reporter TV Trwam: Ustawa o Trybunale Stanu, która obowiązuje od 1982 roku, pozwala Sejmowi na postawienie przed Trybunałem prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego, prezesa Najwyższej Izby Kontroli, członków Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji, ministrów oraz Naczelnego Dowódcę Sił Zbrojnych.

Lektor: „Uchwałę o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu osób, o których mowa w art. 1 ust. 1 punkty 3 do 7 oraz ust. 2, Sejm podejmuje bezwzględną większością głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby posłów”.

Reporter TV Trwam: W innym miejscu ustawy czytamy:

Lektor czyta: „Uchwała Sejmu o pociągnięciu do odpowiedzialności przed Trybunałem Stanu powoduje zawieszenie w czynnościach osoby, której dotyczy”.

Reporter TV Trwam: Zapisy ustawy sprzed 40 lat mogą jednak stać w sprzeczności z zapisami konstytucji, która gwarantuje prezesowi NBP sześcioletnią kadencję. W myśl ustawy zasadniczej szef Narodowego Banku Polskiego jest niezależny od władzy, mówi konstytucjonalistka z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego prof. Anna Łabno.

Prof. Anna Łabno, konstytucjonalista, Uniwersytet Śląski: Nie można zatem prezesa pozbawić urzędu tylko dlatego, że zmienia się większość parlamentarna albo jakieś elementy jego działalności wydają się niewłaściwe, są krytykowane i zbierze się akurat odpowiednia większość.

Reporter TV Trwam: Mimo to liberalno-lewicowa większość widzi w ustawie o Trybunale Stanu furtkę do uderzenia w profesora Adama Glapińskiego. Według informacji, do których dotarła redakcja Informacji Dnia, grupa posłów Prawa i Sprawiedliwości złożyła w Trybunale Konstytucyjnym wniosek o zbadanie zgodności z konstytucją ustawy o Trybunale Stanu. Jak przekazał na antenie Radia Maryja minister edukacji i nauki Krzysztof Szczucki, we wniosku zakwestionowane zostały dwa zapisy ustawy.

Krzysztof Szczucki, minister edukacji i nauki: Po pierwsze fakt, że wystarczy bezwzględna większość głosów, czyli 231 posłów, a przy niepełnej obsadzie posiedzenia Sejmu to nawet wystarczy 116 posłów do postawienia w stan oskarżenia prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego.

Reporter TV Trwam: Zakwestionowany został również przepis, który mówi, że od razu dochodzi do zawieszenia prezesa Narodowego Banku Polskiego. O komentarz do inicjatywy posłów PiS-u zapytaliśmy polityków opozycji. Liberalno-lewicowe partie uważają, że mimo wszystko prezes Glapiński odpowie za rzekome łamanie prawa.

Anita Kucharska-Dziedzic, poseł, Lewica: Przy mówieniu o pieniądzach, przy odpowiedzialności za budżety nie tylko państwa, ale też obywateli, trzeba jednak zachować powagę i szacunek do urzędu, który się sprawuje.

Reporter TV Trwam: Przy okazji podważają Trybunał Konstytucyjny i stawiają pod wątpliwość jego niezależność.

Katarzyna Laubnauer, poseł Koalicji Obywatelskiej: Wiemy, że PiS ma Trybunał Konstytucyjny na pstryknięcie i nie waha się go użyć. Są w stanie nawet uznać, że białe jest czarne, a czarne jest białe.

Reporter TV Trwam: Co by nie mówiła liberalno-lewicowa większość, to w myśl ustawy zasadniczej orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego mają moc powszechnie obowiązującą i są ostateczne, przypomina konstytucjonalista, poseł Prawa i Sprawiedliwości Bartłomiej Wróblewski.

Bartłomiej Wróblewski, konstytucjonalista, poseł PiS: Ale to też trochę pokazuje bezradność opozycji, która chce pokazać swoją sprawczość, za wszelką cenę chce kogoś doprowadzić do sądu i skazać.

Reporter TV Trwam: Trybunał Konstytucyjny opublikuje wniosek posłów Prawa i Sprawiedliwości jutro. Data jego rozpatrzenia jest ustalana.

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